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The term “wealth” refers to the total capital accumulated over a lifetime, and it is usually 
estimated as the net worth of people’s savings, investments and loans. Households need 
wealth to be economically secure, stable and independent, and to create opportunities for the 
next generation (Shapiro, Meschede, & Osoro, 2013). Wealth allows people to move forward 
by moving to better neighborhoods, investing in business, investing in the education of their 
children, and saving for retirement. Wealth can also buffer the effects of temporary income 
loss such in the case of illness or unemployment. Therefore, not accumulating enough wealth 
can profoundly hurt the well-being of individuals and their families. A major concern in the 
current economic climate is the persistent differences in wealth, even among households with 
the same income and socioeconomic characteristics (Agarwal & Mazumder, 2013; Bernheim, 
Skinner, & Weinberg, 2001). To discover the major drivers behind this heterogeneity a wide 
range of possible explanations, including demographic variables, economic preferences, and 
individual differences have been studied (Agarwal & Mazumder, 2013; Ameriks, Caplin, & 
Leahy, 2003; Bernheim et al., 2001; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007; Rindermann & Thompson, 
2011). However, the extent to which wealth heterogeneity can be explained by these factors is 
still subject of debate (Ameriks, et al., 2003; Bernheim et al., 2001). 
Given the important role of wealth in people’s well-being, it is important to obtain 
greater understanding of the major drivers behind wealth accumulation. I believe one 
psychological factor that can help us to understand differences in wealth accumulation is 
individuals’ numeracy. Although different definitions are available in the literature, numeracy 
mainly refers to an individual’s ability to use mathematical knowledge in reflective and 
insight-based ways. Researchers in this field have suggested that numeracy is a key 
determinant of financial outcomes (Banks, O’Dea, & Oldfield, 2011; Lusardi, 2012; Smith, 
McArdle, & Willis, 2010), and a sizeable and growing literature has established a correlation 
between numeracy and several different financial behaviors (see an overview in Lusardi, 
2012). For instance, it has been found that individuals with greater numeracy are more likely 
to participate in financial markets and to invest in stocks (Almenber & Widmark, 2011; 
Christelis, Jappelli, & Padua, 2010;), more likely to plan for retirement (Lusardi & Mitchell, 
2007, 2011), more knowledgeable when choosing a mortgage (Disney & Gathergood, 2011), 
less likely to default (Gerardi, Goette, & Meier, 2010), and more likely to avoid predatory 
loans, pay loans on time, and pay credit cards in full (Sinayev & Peters, 2015). In this thesis, I 
aim to extend prior research by investigating the relationship between numeracy and wealth.      
The study of the psychology of numeracy and, specifically, of the relationship 
between numeracy and wealth is important because it will further our understanding of the 
forces behind wealth differences, but also, because it will further our understanding of the 
scope of numeracy effects. Specifically, we will obtain greater understanding of the extent to 
which numeracy affects people’s financial decisions and financial outcomes. Ultimately, 
research that integrates findings from both psychology and economics will help design 
policies to help people make better financial decisions.   
In this thesis, in order to better understand the relationship between numeracy and 
wealth, I first explored whether this relationship was robust, statistically significant and 
economically relevant (Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). Then, to better understand why numeracy 
and wealth were related, I investigated a possible mechanism (Chapter 4). Precisely, I 
examined the relationship between numeracy and willingness to take financial risks. In my 
attempt to answer these questions I built on economic and psychological literature, and use 
data from the Netherlands and Peru. The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized 
as follows. In the next section I present a more comprehensive definition of the concept of 
numeracy, as well as research documenting how numeracy is related to demographic 
characteristics, to intelligence and to other individual factors. Subsequently, I describe how 
the construct of numeracy has been measured in past research and describe the measures used 
in my studies. Next, I define wealth and explain how wealth can be measured. Lastly, I 
present an overview of the three empirical chapters and the concluding chapter.      
What is numeracy?  
The word numeracy first appeared in a report of the Central Advisory Council for 
Education of England (Lloyd, 1959) in the context of educating schoolchildren. In its original 
sense, numeracy refers to mathematical abilities that go beyond arithmetic calculations 
(Lloyd, 1959). In line with this proposition, numeracy has been commonly defined in the 
literature as “the ability to comprehend, use and attach meaning to numbers” (Nelson, Reyna, 
Fagerlin, Lipkus, & Peters, 2008, p.261). Within this broad definition, however, numeracy is 
understood as a complex concept that encompasses several functional components (Lipkus & 
Peters, 2009; Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009). As I see it, on the one hand, 
numeracy captures an individual’s understanding of mathematical terminology (e.g., numbers, 
numbers line, fractions, proportions, percentages, and probabilities) and mathematical 
procedures (e.g., counting, sorting, calculating, comparing numerical magnitudes). On the 
other hand, numeracy comprises the ability to use numerical information in a meaningful and 
informative way. Therefore, numeracy also includes the ability to determine whether or not to 
use mathematics in a particular situation and if so, to determine what mathematics to use, how 
to do it, and what the answer means in relation to the situation. Other similar definitions from 
the literature are summarized in Table 1. 
 In this thesis, I conceptualize numeracy as an individual’s ability to use mathematical 
knowledge in a reflective and insight-based way. Consequently, I adhere to the idea that 
numeracy extends beyond calculation abilities to color the way people perceive their world, 
how they understand the problems around them and the strategies they use to solve those 
problems. For instance, the findings obtained in Chapter 4 strongly suggests that numeracy 
also influences the specific cognitive processes underlying individual decision making, and 
not only the handling of numbers.     
Table 1. Definitions of numeracy 
Source Definition 
Lloyd, 1959, para.398 A word to represent the mirror image of literacy. 
 
Cockroft, 1982, para.39 We would wish the word “numerate” to imply the possession of 
two attributes. The first of these is an “at-homeness” with 
numbers and an ability to make use of mathematical skills which 
enables an individual to cope with the practical mathematical 
demands of his everyday life. The second is an ability to have 
some appreciation and understanding of information which is 
presented in mathematical terms, for instance in graphs, charts or 
tables or by reference to percentage increase or decrease. 
 
Gal, 1995, para.9 The term numeracy describes the aggregate of skills, knowledge, 
beliefs, dispositions, and habits of mind-as well as the general 
communicative and problem-solving skills-that people need in 
order to effectively handle real-world situations or interpretative 
tasks with embedded mathematical or quantifiable elements. 
 
Adelswärd & Sachs, 
1996, p.1186 
Numeracy, in the sense of knowledge and mastery of systems for 
quantification, measurement and calculation, is a practice-driven 
competence rather than abstract academic knowledge of 
“mathematics.” Proficiency in numeracy varies with people’s 
backgrounds and experience. 
 
Montori & Rothman, 
2005, p. 1071 
Numeracy skills include understanding basic calculations, time 
and money, measurement, estimation, logic, and performing 
multistep operations. Most importantly, numeracy also involves 
the ability to infer what mathematic concepts need to be applied 
when interpreting specific situations. 
 
Nelson et al., 2008, 
p.261 
The ability to comprehend, use and attach meaning to numbers. 
 
How is numeracy related to demographic characteristics? 
Studies using representative national samples have shown that low numeracy is 
widespread even in developed countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and 
Japan (Galesic, & García-Retamero, 2010; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD], 2013; Peters, Hibbard, Slovic, & Dieckmann, 2007). Thus, observed 
low levels of numeracy are prevalent worldwide, rather than specific to any given country or 
stage of economic development. Moreover, these studies have documented persistent 
differences by population subgroups (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011; Schaie, 1993; Wood et al., 
2011). First, age patterns are notable, proficiency in numeracy follows an inverted U-shaped 
pattern, peaking in middle age (around 30 years of age) and then declining steadily thereafter, 
being lowest for the younger and the older groups. However, there are some notable cohort 
differences, with older cohorts demonstrating stronger numeric abilities than younger cohorts 
(Wood et al., 2011). 
Second, there are persistent sex differences (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011; Schaie, 1993; 
Wood et al., 2011). On average, men have higher numeracy scores than women. However, the 
latest data from the OECD’s Programme for the International Assessment of Adult 
Competencies (PIAAC; OECD, 2013), which measures numeracy skills among adults aged 
16-65 from 24 countries, highlighted that in half the countries surveyed, there was no 
difference between young men and young women. This indicates that among younger adults, 
the gender gap in numeracy is negligible. Lastly, these studies have found an association 
between numeracy and education (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2011; Schaie, 1993; OECD, 2013; 
Wood et al., 2011). Higher educational attainment is correlated with higher numeracy, but 
numeracy levels vary considerable among individuals with similar qualifications (OECD, 
2013). This implies that formal education plays a key role in developing numeracy skills, but 
that more education does not automatically translate into higher numeracy. 
Given that there are stables differences in numeracy in the population, numeracy 
researchers need to cautiously consider the selection of the sample. Specifically, it is 
important to examine when it is appropriate to use a college student sample, and when it is 
not. There are two major disadvantages of using a student sample for the type of studies 
reported in this thesis. First, student samples tend to be more numerate than the general 
population (Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & García-Retamero, 2012; Weller, Dieckmann, 
Tusler, Mertz, Burns, & Peters, 2013) and, therefore, it might not be possible to observe 
potential effects of being innumerate or moderately numerated on wealth accumulation. 
Second, the limited variation in numeracy within the student sample may cause some 
numeracy effects to be underappreciated. It is possible that the restriction in the range of 
numeracy scores, common in student samples, resulted in a lower observed correlation than it 
would have if data from the entire possible range were analyzed. Taking these reasons into 
consideration, I did not use student samples in my studies. In Chapter 3, I used a sample from 
an agrarian population in Peru, which includes participants with zero years of formal 
education. In Chapter 2, I used a large and diverse sample from the Dutch population. 
However, student samples can provide great insights to other research questions such as the 
effect of numeracy on cognitive biases (Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012; Peters 
& Levin, 2008) or the relationship between numeracy and other individual differences 
(Liberali et al., 2012). Taking this into consideration, in the section about how is numeracy 
related to thinking styles and personality, I used a sample of psychology students.   
 How is numeracy related to intelligence? 
 Numeracy is related, but separable, from general intelligence. At least three sources of 
evidence support the validity of numeracy as a separate construct from intelligence. First, 
neuroimaging studies of healthy individuals, as well as neuropsychological analyses of brain-
damaged patients, have documented the existence of specialized neuronal circuits dedicated to 
numerical processing (see a meta-analysis in Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 2003). 
Specifically, neuroimaging studies have recorded the activity of several single neurons in the 
human parietal cortex and have found that neurons in this region fired for numeric tasks but 
not for linguistic tasks (Abdullaev & Melnichuk, 1996). In addition, studies with brain-
damaged patients revealed that lesions to the inferior-parietal region of the brain can destroy 
numerical knowledge without impairing nonnumerical knowledge (Dehaene, 1997). In a 
similar vein, a study with older adults reported that individuals with vast experience on 
numerical processing, such as retired accountants, present age-related declines in 
nonnumerical memory while preserving numerical memory similar to young adults (Castel, 
2007).  
A second line of evidence comes from studies documenting that different cognitive 
skills such as mathematical computation, working memory, and fluid reasoning have different 
patterns of change throughout the course of maturation (Baker, Salinas, & Eslinger, 2012; 
Eslinger et al., 2008), which implies that numerical ability can be developed independent of 
other cognitive abilities. Finally, substantive research has shown that numeracy’s effects on 
judgment and decision-making tasks are robust after controlling for different measures of 
intelligence (Liberali et al., 2011; Peters, Västfjäll, Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, & Dickert, 
2006; Reyna & Brainerd, 2007).  
Altogether, these findings support the validity of numeracy as a separate construct 
from intelligence. This is important because it indicates that numeracy and intelligence can 
have different effects on people’s judgments and decisions. Then, it is valuable to obtain 
greater understanding of when and how each of these cognitive abilities plays a role. Such 
knowledge about the psychology of numeracy will add precision to our understanding of how 
different cognitive abilities affect individuals’ decision making. Results in Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 add to this debate and reveal that numeracy has an effect on wealth that is 
independent of participants’ intelligence.    
 
 
How is numeracy related to thinking styles and personality measures? 
 In order to further explore the validity of the construct of numeracy, it is important to 
understand how numeracy is associated to (or differs from) other characteristics of the 
individual. Unfortunately, there has been relatively little systematic examination of the 
relationship between numeracy and other individual differences (exemptions are Cokely et al., 
2012; Liberali et al., 2011). To explore this question, I conducted a preliminary exploratory 
study. Specifically, I investigated the association between numeracy, thinking styles and 
personality traits. Participants were 163 first-year psychology students at Tilburg University 
(133 women, 30 men) ranging in age from 16 to 27 years (M = 18.9, SD = 1.8). Numeracy 
was measured with the 4-item Berlin Numeracy Test (Cokely et al., 2012). Participants also 
completed the 40-item Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI-40; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) that 
measures rational (e.g., "I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking") and 
experiential (e.g., "I trust my initial feelings about people") thinking styles and the 10-item 
Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) assessing the Big Five 
personality traits. Partial and full correlations are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2. Partial and full correlation between numeracy, personality and thinking styles 
Variable  Full correlation Partial correlation 
Personality measures   
Openness .057 .056 
Conscientiousness -.080 -.048 
Extraversion -.112 -.100 
Agreeableness .134 .133 
Neuroticism -.124 -.095 
Thinking styles   
Rational thinking style .175* .199* 
Experiential thinking style .100 .109 
Note: Entries in table are correlation coefficients between numeracy and the other measures in 
the analysis. *p < .05, **p < .01. Partial correlations are estimated controlling for gender and 
age.  
 Partial correlations, controlling for gender and age, revealed that numeracy correlated 
positively with the factor measuring rational thinking style (r = .199, p = .012). However, 
numeracy was not correlated with the experiential thinking style factor (r = .109, p = .168) or 
personality traits (all p values > .093). These exploratory findings provide tentative evidence 
for construct validity. In other words, numeracy was found to have a significant positive 
relationship with a construct that should theoretically be related (i.e., rational thinking), but 
not to be correlated to unrelated constructs like personality or experiential thinking.  
How can we measure an individual’s numeracy? 
Objective and subjective measures of numeracy are available in the literature. 
Objective scales measure the ability to perform mathematical operations, to solve problems 
involving numerical information, and to interpret information. In contrast, subjective scales 
measure how confident and comfortable people feel about their numerical ability. In Chapter 
2 and Chapter 4, numeracy was assessed with the 11-item Numeracy Scale developed by 
Lipkus, Samsa and Rimer (2001). It is an objective scale that measures respondents’ ability to 
perform basic arithmetic operations, and to solve problems involving frequency, probability, 
and percentages. An example question is: “Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 
times. Out of 1,000 rolls how many times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 
6)?” (Correct answer: 500 out of 1,000). This scale is the most commonly used measured in 
empirical studies. In Chapter 3, a 3-item scale was developed based on the Lipkus, Samsa and 
Rimer (2001) scale but adapted to the rural agrarian population. This scale is presented and 
discussed in Chapter 3. For the sake of completeness, at the end of this chapter, I provide an 
overview of the most often used scales that are available in the literature.   
 
 
Comparison of subjective and objective measures 
Although some studies have found a significant correlation between the subjective 
numeracy scale (SNS) and objective measures (Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, Jankovic, 
Derry, & Smith, 2007; Galesic & García-Retamero, 2010), researchers have stated that 
subjective and objective numeracy did not correlate well enough with each other to be 
interchangeable (Liberali et al., 2012; Cokely et al. 2012). For instance, in two studies 
Liberali and colleagues (2012) showed that the correlation between the SNS and the Lipkus 
scale (Lipkus et al., 2001) was about .45 and .47 (.20 lower than the .68 reported by Fagerlin 
et al., 2007). With a correlation of .47, the shared variance is only 22%. Liberali and 
colleagues (2012) also showed that the test items of the SNS did not load on the same factors 
as the objective measures. For all these concerns about subjective measures not measuring the 
same construct as the objective measures, I did not use subjective scale in my studies.  
Finally, since this thesis focuses on studying the relationship between numeracy and 
wealth, let me next explain what wealth is and how it can be measured.  
What is and how can we measure wealth? 
Wealth is usually understood as the value of all financial assets, nonfinancial assets 
and liabilities accrued over the lifetime. The most comprehensive wealth measures, like the 
one designed by the Survey of Consumer Finances in The United States, include the value of 
financial assets such as (i) checking, saving, money market, and call accounts; (ii) IRA and 
Keogh accounts; (iii) certificates of deposit; (iv) stocks, bonds, mutual funds, savings bonds; 
(v) trusts, annuities and other managed assets; and (v) cash value life insurance. It also 
contains the value of nonfinancial assets such as the respondent’s principal residence, 
investment real estate, vehicles, business interests, and other valuable assets such as art and 
precious metals. Finally, it includes the value of debt and liabilities such as mortgages, home 
equity loans and lines of credit, loans for investment real estate, vehicle loans, student loans, 
consumer installment loans, and debt on credit cards (Fries, Starr-McCluer, & Sundén, 1998). 
However, there are no standard measures of wealth available in the literature, since the pool 
of assets that are included depends on the availability of information on an individual level. In 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 wealth was measured using information on assets and liabilities. The 
inventory covers checking and saving accounts, stocks, bonds and other financial assets, real 
estate, mortgages, loans, and lines of credit.       
The measurement of wealth has shown to be particularly challenging in developing 
countries where individuals have little or no access to financial services (Sahn & Stifel, 2000, 
2003). In response, alternative measures based on indicators of ownership of durable goods 
such as radios, TVs, sewing machines, stoves, or bicycles, and housing characteristics such as 
the number of rooms, or the type of toilet facilities have been developed (Filmer & Pritchett, 
2001; Sahn & Stifel, 2003; Smits & Steendijk, 2014). These alternative measures have shown 
to be as reliable as more conventional measures like the one described above (Filmer & 
Pritchett, 2001; Montgomery, Gragnolati, Burke, & Paredes, 2000). In Chapter 3 wealth was 
estimated using this alternative type of measures.     
Overview of the chapters 
 In this thesis I investigated whether the relationship between numeracy and wealth 
was robust, statistically significant and economically relevant. In addition, to better 
understand why numeracy and wealth were related, I investigated a possible mechanism. 
Precisely, I examined the relationship between numeracy and willingness to take financial 
risks. The empirical chapters are based on individual papers that have been submitted for 
publication. All chapters are designed in such a way that they can be read individually, which 
explains the partial overlap between the introductions for each chapter. Since the original 
papers were all coauthored with my supervisors and other researchers, I decided to use a “we-
form” instead of an “I-form” in those. Below, I summarize the chapters to show the reader 
what can be expected in the remainder of this book. 
Chapter 2: This chapter examines the relationship between numeracy and wealth 
using a cross-sectional and a longitudinal study. For a sample of approximately 1,000 Dutch 
adults, we found an economically relevant and statistically significant correlation between 
numeracy and wealth, even after controlling for differences in education, intelligence, risk 
preferences, beliefs about future income, financial knowledge, need for cognition or seeking 
financial advice. Conditional on socio-demographic characteristics, our estimates suggest that 
on average a one-point increase in the numeracy score of the respondent is associated with 5 
percent more personal wealth. Additionally, we found that numeracy is a key determinant of 
the wealth accumulation trajectories that people follow over time. Over a 5-year period, while 
participants with low numeracy decumulate wealth, participants with high numeracy maintain 
a constant positive level of wealth.  
Chapter 3: In this paper, we investigate whether numeracy also has a positive 
influence on wealth in an agrarian population from the Highlands of Peru, a simpler financial 
environment where wealth is acquired through monetary exchanges, barter and reciprocal 
labor. Wealth was measured using data on asset ownership (e.g., owning a bicycle or radio) 
and housing characteristics (e.g., type of toilet facilities). Result from regression analysis and 
SEM models revealed that the positive relationship between numeracy and wealth was 
substantial and statistically significant even after accounting for differences in fluid 
intelligence and crystallized intelligence, potential demographic confounders, and the direct 
effects of education. These findings contribute to the growing research in numeracy by 
documenting the positive effect of numeracy on wealth in a population with a less 
sophisticated financial market where mathematical abilities are presumably less imperative 
for wealth accumulation. 
Chapter 4: This chapter examines the relationship between numeracy and willingness 
to take risks for a representative sample of the Dutch population, controlling for potential 
confounding factors (e.g., age, gender, education, and income). We also modeled the decision 
strategies underlying the choices and tested whether strategy selection was conditional upon 
participant’s numeracy, payoffs, or both. Specifically, we considered an expected value 
strategy (EV), as well as three heuristic strategies: least-likely, maximin, and maximax. Our 
findings revealed no significant differences on the willingness to take risk between 
individuals with low and high numeracy for low payoffs. However, for high payoffs, high 
numeracy individuals were significantly less willing to take risk than low numeracy 
individuals. In terms of the decision strategies, as participants’ numeracy increased, the 
likelihood of using EV increased when payoffs were low, but decreased when payoffs were 
high. The opposite was observed for the maximin strategy. Independently of the payoffs, as 
numeracy increased the likelihood of choosing the least-likely or the maximax strategy 
decreased.  
To conclude, in Chapter 5 the empirical findings from the previous chapters are 
combined into a parsimonious view of the relationship between numeracy and wealth. 
General conclusions are drawn regarding the association between numeracy and wealth. 
Finally, implications for numeracy research are discussed and promising research topics for 




Overview of objective and subjective numeracy scales 
Next I provide an overview of the most often used scales that are available in the 
literature. Table 3 summarizes the items from all the measures described below.  
Objective Numeracy Scales  
11-item Numeracy Scale. This scale is based on three questions developed by 
Schwartz, Woloshin, Black and Welch (1997) and expanded later by Lipkus, Samsa and 
Rimer (2001). The scale assesses respondents’ basic arithmetic and statistical skills. An 
example question is: “Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 
rolls how many times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)?” (Correct 
answer: 500 out of 1,000). The total resulting numeracy score reflects the sum of correct 
answers, with higher scores indicating higher levels of numeracy. Possible scores range from 
0-11.  
 Berlin Numeracy Test. The scale was designed by Cokely and colleagues (2012) as 
an instrument to quickly assess statistical numeracy. It is based on 4 questions. It is available 
in a traditional paper and pencil format and a computer adaptive test format. An example 
question is: “Out of 1,000 people in a small town 500 are members of a choir. Out of these 
500 members in the choir 100 are men. Out of the 500 inhabitants that are not in the choir 300 
are men. What is the probability that a randomly drawn man is a member of the choir? Please 
indicate the probability in percent” (Correct answer: 25%). The total resulting numeracy score 
reflects the sum of correct answers, with higher scores indicating higher levels of numeracy. 
Possible scores range from 0-4.      
8-item Numeracy Scale. The scale was developed by Weller and colleagues (2013). It 
is based on 8 questions extracted from existing scales: Lipkus et al. (2001), Peters et al., 
(2007), and Frederick’s (2005; CRT). An example question is: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in 
total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” The total 
resulting numeracy score reflects the sum of correct answers, with higher scores indicating 
higher levels of numeracy. Possible scores range from 0-8.       
Subjective Numeracy Scales 
The Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS). The SNS was developed by Fagerlin and 
colleagues (2007) to distinguish between low- and high- numerate individuals, on the basis of 
respondents’ self-assessment of their quantitative ability. The SNS contains four items that 
measure respondents’ perception of their numerical ability (e.g., “How good are you at 
working with fractions”) and four items that pertain to preferences for numeric information 
presentation (e.g., “When reading the newspaper, how helpful do you find tables and graphs 
that are parts of a story”). Respondents evaluate each item using a 6-point Likert Scale, with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of numeracy or higher preference for numerical 









Table 3. Items from the objective and subjective numeracy scales 
 Objective Numeracy Scales Subjective 
Numeracy Scale 
Fagerlin et al., 2007 
 11-item Numeracy Scale 
Lipkus et al., 2001 
Berlin Numeracy Test 
Cokely et al., 2012 
8-item Numeracy Scale 
Weller et al., 2013 
1 Imagine that we rolled a 
fair, six-sided die 1,000 
times. Out of 1,000 rolls, 
how many times do you 
think the die would come 
up even (2, 4, or 6)? 
Imagine we are throwing a 
five-sided die 50 times. On 
average, out of these 50 
throws how many times 
would this five-sided die 
show an odd number (1, 3 
or 5)?  
Imagine that we rolled a 
fair, six-sided die 1,000 
times. Out of 1,000 rolls, 
how many times do you 
think the die would come 
up even (2, 4, or 6)? 
How good are you at 
working with 
fractions?  
2 In the BIG BUCKS 
LOTTERY, the chances 
of winning a $10.00 prize 
is 1%.What is your best 
guess about how many 
people would win a 
$10.00 prize if 1,000 
people each buy a single 
ticket to BIG BUCKS?        
Out of 1,000 people in a 
small town 500 are 
members of a choir. Out of 
these 500 members in the 
choir 100 are men. Out of 
the 500 inhabitants that are 
not in the choir 300 are 
men. What is the 
probability that a randomly 
drawn man is a member of 
the choir? Please indicate 
the probability in percent.  
In the BIG BUCKS 
LOTTERY, the chances 
of winning a $10.00 prize 
is 1%.What is your best 
guess about how many 
people would win a 
$10.00 prize if 1,000 
people each buy a single 
ticket to BIG BUCKS?        
How good are you at 
working with 
percentages?  
3 In the ACME 
PUBLISHING 
SWEEPSTAKES, the 
chance of winning a car is 
1 in 1,000. What percent 
of tickets to ACME 
PUBLISHINGSWEEPST
AKES win a car?                                                                                                
Imagine we are throwing a 
loaded die (6 sides). The 
probability that the die 
shows a 6 is twice as high 
as the probability of each 
of the other numbers. On 
average, out of these 70 
throws, how many times
would the die show the 
number 6?  
In the ACME 
PUBLISHING 
SWEEPSTAKES, the 
chance of winning a car is 
1 in 1,000. What percent 
of tickets to ACME 
PUBLISHINGSWEEPST
AKES win a car?                                                                                             
How good are you at 
calculating a 15% 
tip?  
4 Which of the following 
numbers represents the 
biggest risk of getting a 
disease? 1 in 100, 1 in 
1000, 1 in 10 
In a forest 20% of 
mushrooms are red, 50% 
brown and 30% white. A 
red mushroom is poisonous 
with a probability of 20%. 
A mushroom that is not red 
is poisonous with a 
probability of 5%. What is 
the probability that a 
poisonous mushroom in 
the forest is red?  
If the chance of getting a 
disease is 10%, how many 
people would be expected 
to get the disease: Out of 
1000? 
How good are you at 
figuring out how 
much a shirt will cost 
if it is 25% off?  
5 Which of the following 
numbers represents the 
biggest risk of getting a 
disease? 1%, 10%, 5% 
 If the chance of getting a 
disease is 20 out of 100, 
this would be the same as 
having a ____% chance of 
getting the disease 
When reading the 
newspaper, how 
helpful do you find 
tables and graphs 
that are parts of a 
story? (Not at all 





Table 3. Items from the objective and subjective numeracy scales (Continued) 
 Objective Numeracy Scales Subjective 
Numeracy Scale 
Fagerlin et al., 2007 
 11-item Numeracy Scale 
Lipkus et al., 2001 
Berlin Numeracy Test 
Cokely et al., 2012 
8-item Numeracy Scale 
Weller et al., 2013 
6 If Person A’s risk of 
getting a disease is 1% in 
ten years, and person B’s 
risk is double that of A’s, 
what is B’s risk? 
 A bat and a ball cost $1.10 
in total. The bat costs 
$1.00 more than the ball. 
How much does the ball 
cost? 
When people tell you 
the chance of 
something 
happening, do you 
prefer that they use 
words ("it rarely 
happens") or 
numbers ("there's a 
1% chance")?  
7 If Person A’s chance of 
getting a disease is 1 in 
100 in ten years, and 
person B’s risk is double 
that of A’s, what is B’s 
risk? 
 In a lake, there is a patch 
of lily pads. Every day, 
the patch doubles in size. 
If it takes 48 days for the 
patch to cover the entire 
lake, how long would it 
take for the patch to cover 
half of the lake? 
How often do you 
find numerical 
information to be 
useful? (Never – 
Very often) 
8 If the chance of getting a 
disease is 10%, how many 
people would be expected 
to get the disease: Out of 
100?  
 Suppose you have a close 
friend who has a lump in 
her breast and must have a 
mammography. The table 
below summarizes all of 
this information. Imagine 
that your friend tests 
positive (as if she had a 
tumor), what is the 
likelihood that she 
actually has a tumor? 
When you hear a 




“there will be a 20% 
chance of rain 
today”) or 
predictions using 
only words (e.g., 
“there is a small 
chance of rain 
today”)? 
9 If the chance of getting a 
disease is 10%, how many 
people would be expected 
to get the disease: Out of 
1000? 
   
10 If the chance of getting a 
disease is 20 out of 100, 
this would be the same as 
having a ____% chance of 
getting the disease 
   
11 The chance of getting a 
viral infection is .0005. 
Out of 10,000 people, 
about how many of them 
are expected to get 
infected? 
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Numeracy is defined as the ability to understand and use numerical information. We 
examined the relationship between numeracy and wealth using a cross-sectional and a 
longitudinal study. For a sample of approximately 1,000 Dutch adults, we found an 
economically relevant and statistically significant correlation between numeracy and wealth, 
even after controlling for differences in education, intelligence, risk preferences, beliefs about 
future income, financial knowledge, need for cognition or seeking financial advice. 
Conditional on socio-demographic characteristics, our estimates suggest that on average a 
one-point increase in the numeracy score of the respondent is associated with 5 percent more 
personal wealth. Additionally, we find that numeracy is a key determinant of the wealth 
accumulation trajectories that people follow over time. Over a 5-year period, while 
participants with low numeracy decumulate wealth, participants with high numeracy maintain 











Recent economic trends have made individuals increasingly responsible for their own 
financial security upon retirement. Financial security greatly depends on the ability to 
accumulate adequate wealth (Wolff, 1998; 2006), since wealth can be a significant source of 
retirement income. One concern in the current economic climate is the persistent differences 
in wealth and savings, even among households with the same income and socioeconomic 
characteristics (Bernheim, Skinner, & Weinberg, 2001). Economists and policy makers have 
devoted great efforts in understanding this heterogeneity in wealth, and numerous 
determinants have been proposed. However, the extent to which this heterogeneity can be 
explained by demographic variables or by economic preferences is still subject of debate 
(Ameriks, Caplin, & Leahy, 2003; Bernheim et al., 2001). Lately, psychologists have also 
developed an interest in the problem and have provided evidence that individual differences 
in personality, motivation, and intelligence are predictors of wealth differentials (Agarwal & 
Mazumder, 2013; Brown & Taylor, 2014; Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007; Rindermann & 
Thompson, 2011). In the current article, we extend that literature by studying the role of 
numeracy in personal wealth accumulation. Numeracy is defined as the ability to understand 
and use probabilistic and mathematical concepts. Specifically, we address the question of 
whether differences in numeracy contribute to differences in the accumulation of wealth. We 
examine this using a cross-sectional and longitudinal model, while controlling for other 
demographic, socio-economic and individual characteristics. The underlying premise is that 
people with high numeracy accumulate more wealth than people with low numeracy.  
Previous findings are consistent with the hypothesis that numeracy is related to wealth 
and wealth growth. In one of the first studies in this vein, Banks and Oldfield (2007) 
document a strong positive relationship between numeracy and financial wealth, even when 
controlling for other dimensions of cognitive ability as well as educational attainment. 
Subsequent research has found tentative evidence for differences in wealth accumulation 
among groups with different numerical ability. That is, in the years leading up to retirement 
those who are more numerate accumulate financial assets faster than those who are less 
numerate (Banks, O’Dea, & Oldfield, 2011; Smith, McArdle, & Willis, 2010). Although the 
results presented above are in line with our predictions, they are limited in the sense that it 
remains unclear whether numeracy is directly correlated with wealth or whether numeracy is 
correlated with a third factor, so far unobserved, that is correlated with financial outcomes. 
For example, people low in numeracy might have different risk or time preferences, face 
different incentives and constraints, have different information, or hold different beliefs. 
Consequentially, it is possible that the observed correlation of numeracy and wealth does not 
exist in the population but is the result of omitting a third key variable as predictor. If this was 
the case, it would indicate that numeracy does not have a direct effect on people’s wealth but 
an indirect effect through its relation with this third factor. Moreover, it would imply that 
numeracy has a weak or no effect on people’s financial decisions and that it cannot explain 
differences in people’s wealth.  
The current article builds on this previous research to investigate whether there is an 
economically relevant and statistically significant correlation between numeracy and wealth. 
We aim to test whether this correlation is robust to the inclusion of controls for other possible 
factors affecting wealth. We restrict this analysis to factors that, a-priori, have shown to be 
related with numeracy and financial outcomes. These factors are risk preferences (Cokely & 
Kelley, 2009; Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, & Wagner, 2011; Donkers & Van 
Soest, 1999; Reyna, Nelson, Han, & Dieckmann, 2009), seeking financial advice (Hackethal, 
Haliassos, & Jappelli, 2012; Hung & Yoong, 2010), beliefs about future income (Carroll, 
1994), financial knowledge (Behrman, Mitchell, Soo, & Bravo, 2012; Van Rooij, Lusardi, & 
Alessie, 2012), and need for cognition (Simon, Fagley, & Halleran, 2004). We examine 
whether the estimated correlation between numeracy and wealth is much affected by the 
inclusion of these additional controls. Moreover, we explore whether numeracy is related to 
the wealth accumulation trajectories that people follow over time. We study how the 
processes unfold and whether numeracy has an effect on the rate of change in wealth across a 
5-year time period. Let us first explain why we might expect wealth to vary with numeracy.  
Relationship between numeracy and wealth: three sources of influence 
Numeracy concerns comprehending, processing, and using numerical information 
appropriately (Peters, 2012; Peters et al., 2006; Reyna et al., 2009). Findings from decision-
making research suggest a number of reasons why we might expect numeracy and wealth to 
be related. First, there is substantive evidence that an individual’s numeracy can predict 
mistakes in probability judgment that have been shown to have pervasive effects on people’s 
financial outcomes. Specifically, compared to people low in numeracy, people high in 
numeracy are less sensitive to framing effects (Peters et al., 2006), less likely to fall prey of 
conjunction and disjunction fallacies, and less susceptible to the ratio-bias phenomena 
(Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012). These biases and fallacies distort risk 
perceptions and may lead to misunderstandings of the decision options and suboptimal 
decisions. We expect that individuals with low numeracy, who are more likely to fall prey of 
these biases and fallacies, would be more likely to make suboptimal financial decisions (e.g., 
maintaining credit cards debts and mortgages when cheaper forms of credit are available) and 
end up accumulating less wealth. 
Second, numeracy appears to have an effect on individuals’ risk and time preferences 
that are likely to affect financial behavior. People with higher numerical ability are more 
likely to take strategic risks (Jasper, Bhattacharya, Levin, Jones, & Bossard, 2013; Pachur & 
Galesic, 2013). In a series of studies participants high in numeracy preferred a risky 
alternative when it was advantageous to do so and avoided it when it was not (Jasper et al., 
2013). Moreover, this “strategic” risk management strategy increased their final outcome in 
the game. Numeracy has also shown to be related with time preferences. Chilean high-school 
students with higher numeracy were less impatient; they chose larger delayed rewards over 
smaller immediate rewards (Benjamin, Brown, & Schapiro, 2013). This is relevant because 
impatient people persistently report less wealth by the time of retirement (Hasting & Mitchell, 
2011). Taken together, these findings suggest that numeracy systematically affects economic 
preferences and choices in ways that favor wealth accumulation.   
Finally, people high in numeracy appear to be more able to process information and to 
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information. In a series of studies participants 
were asked to choose among different hospital and insurance plans; the options were 
described using multiple numerical and non-numerical attributes (Peters, Dieckman, Dixon, 
Hibbard, & Mertz, 2007; Peters, Dieckmann, Västfjäll, Mertz, Slovic, & Hibbard, 2009). 
People high in numeracy made more “optimal” decisions, choosing the option with the best 
numerical quality indicators. This suggests that participants high in numeracy were better able 
to integrate multiple types of mathematical information, draw inferences, develop 
mathematical arguments and justify their choices. Given the complexity of saving and 
portfolio choices individuals in modern financial markets face, it is likely that those with 
higher ability to understand the different alternatives would make better decisions. Let us now 
turn to our study.  
Method 
Participants 
 We used data from the LISS panel (Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social 
sciences), an organization affiliated with Tilburg University. The panel is designed to be a 
representative sample of the Dutch population and consists of approximately 8,000 
individuals. Panel members complete a questionnaire over the Internet each month and are 
paid for each completed questionnaire. We recovered demographic variables and financial 
information from three measurement waves across 5 years, namely 2007, 2009 and 2011. 
Additionally, we matched this information with the numeracy score of each respondent, 
which was measured in 2008 (see Appendix A for an overview of the different 
questionnaires). Since not all respondents in the Panel have information in all background and 
financial variables, our sample consists of 1,019 panel members. Descriptive statistics of all 
variables are presented in Table 1.     
Table 1. Summary table of variables used in the study (year 2009) 
Variable  Explanation Mean SD N 
Wealth Wealth in euros €66,876 €204,313 1,019 
Numeracy Numeracy scores. Range (0-11), 11 items, 
Cronbach's alpha = .78. Higher scores indicate 
higher level of numeracy 
8.79 2.41 1,019 
CRT Cognitive Reflection Test scores. Range (0-3), 3 
items, Cronbach's alpha = .65. Higher scores 
indicate higher level of cognitive ability 
1.19 1.11 212 
Risk preferences Answer to the question “How would you rate your 
willingness to take risk” (0=highly risk averse, 
10=fully prepared to take risks) 
3.67 2.38 468 
Financial advisor The respondent seeks financial advice (coded 
1=yes, 0=no). Percentage of respondents who 
answered “yes” 
26.7%  954 
Sufficient income Net monthly income necessarily to maintain their 
lifestyle in euros 
€3,235 €4,462 1,006 
Financial knowledge Answer to the question “How would you score your 
understanding of financial matters” (1= very poor, 
7=very good) 
5.13 1.16 965 
Need for cognition Need for cognition scores. Range (0-7), 18 items, 
Cronbach's alpha = .88. Higher scores indicate 
higher need for cognition 
4.51 0.94 1,007 
Female Female dummy (coded 1=female, 0=male). 
Percentage of female 
42.2%  1,019 
Age Age of the respondent 53.62 15.21 1,019 
 (Continued) 
Table 1. Summary table of variables used in the study (Continued) 
Variable Explanation Mean SD N 
Partnered The respondent lives together with a partner (coded 
1=yes, 0=no). Percentage of respondents who 
answered “yes” 
73%  1,019 
Children Number of living-at-home children 0.64 1.03 1,019 
High Education The respondent achieved higher education (coded 
1=yes, 0=no). Percentage of respondents who 
answered “yes” 
39.5%  1,019 
Income Personal net annual income in euros €23,168 €61,074 1,019 
Paid work The respondent’s primary occupation is paid 
employment (coded 1=yes, 0=no). Percentage of 
respondents who answered “yes” 
49.8%  1,019 
Retired The respondent’s primary occupation is retired 
(coded 1=yes, 0=no). Percentage of respondents 
who answered “yes” 




Demographic. Gender, age, education and work status were retrieved for all 
participants for 2007, 2009 and 2011. Participants who reported finishing higher vocational 
education or university received a score of 1 and 0 otherwise. Work status was collapsed in 
three categories: Paid work, retired or other.      
Numeracy. Numeracy was measured using an 11-item scale (Lipkus, Samsa, & 
Rimmer, 2001) which tests for basic arithmetic and statistical skills. An example question is: 
“Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls how many times 
do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)?” (Correct answer: 500 out of 1,000). 
Total scores were computed counting the number of correct answers, with higher scores 
indicating higher levels of numeracy. Possible scores range from 0-11. Cronbach's alpha =.78. 
Appendix B gives a complete overview of the questions, including the percentages of correct 
answers and a graph of the distribution of numeracy in our sample.   
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). Panel members completed a three-item Cognitive 
Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) to measure one type of cognitive ability—the ability or 
disposition to reflect on a question and resist reporting the first response that comes to mind. 
An example of a question is: “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more 
than the ball. How much does the ball cost?” (Correct answer: 5 cents). Test scores were 
calculated by counting the number of correct answers, with higher scores reflecting higher 
levels of cognitive ability. Possible scores range from 0-3. Cronbach's alpha = .65. 
Risk preferences. Risk preferences were measure by the following question: “People 
can behave differently in different situations. How would you rate your willingness to take 
risks in the following areas? Your willingness to take risks…[in financial matters]” on a scale 
of 0 to 10, where 0 means “highly risk averse” and 10 means “fully prepared to take risks”.  
Need for cognition. The Need for Cognition Scale is an assessment instrument that 
quantitatively measures “the tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking” 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 116). Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which they 
agree with each of 18 statements (nine reverse coded) about the satisfaction they gain from 
thinking. Sample statements include "I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long 
hours" and "Thinking is not my idea of fun". Participants responded to the statements using a 
7-point Likert scale (1=strongly agree to 7=strongly disagree). We calculated an average such 
that higher numbers reflected higher need for cognition. Possible scores range from 0-7.  
Cronbach's alpha = .88.  
Financial knowledge. The LISS panel survey contains only one question to assess 
self-perception of financial knowledge. Respondents are asked to answer to the question 
“How would you score your understanding of financial matters” on a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 
means “very poor” and 7 means “very good”.  
Financial advisor. Panel members reported whether or not they generally asked for 
financial advice. Responders were asked to answer yes or no to the question “In deciding 
what financial product to purchase, I would let myself be influenced by an independent 
financial adviser” (dummy-coded: 1= yes, 0= no).  
Beliefs about minimum sufficient income. Panel members indicated the amount of 
income necessary to maintain their lifestyle. They were asked to consider the current 
circumstances of their household and to indicate, for their household, in their current 
circumstances, what amount of net income per month they would consider sufficient to live. 
Log-transformed scores were used in the analyses that follow.  
 Income. LISS Panel members indicated their personal net monthly income in Euros 
for 2007, 2009 and 2011. Net annual income was obtained by multiplying the raw score by 
12. Log-transformed scores were used for analyses.  
Dependent variable. 
Wealth. The LISS Panel has collected information about wealth every second year 
starting from 2007. All panel members age 16 and older respond to questions about the assets 
and liabilities that they hold alone. The inventory covers checking and saving accounts, 
stocks, bonds and other financial assets, real estate, mortgages, loans, and lines of credit. 
Wealth was measured as shown in equation 1, which is similar to the measures typically used 
in studies of precautionary saving and wealth (Choi, Kariv, Müller, & Silverman, 2014; 
Noussair, Trautmann, & Van de Kuile, 2013). Total wealth scores were log-transformed 
before undergoing statistical analyses.  
 
Procedure 
 Our analysis proceeds in four steps. We first establish the correlation between 
numeracy and wealth by estimating regressions of the log of wealth on the log of income, 
demographic variables and the numeracy score of the responder. Second, we show that 
cognitive ability cannot be used as a substitute for numeracy. Third, we demonstrate that the 
correlation between numeracy and wealth is quantitatively robust to the inclusion of 
additional controls. We show that including these factors in the regression does not reduce (or 
eliminate) the correlation between numeracy and wealth. Last, we estimate a multilevel model 
to show that numeracy is related to the wealth accumulation trajectories that people follow 
over time.  
Results  
Cross-sectional estimation of the relationship between wealth and numeracy 
 Our first step was to test whether numeracy has an effect on wealth that is 
economically important and that cannot be explained by other socioeconomic characteristics. 
Table 2, column A, presents the estimated correlation between numeracy and wealth when no 
controls are included. Numeracy had a significant positive effect on wealth (p < .001) and the 
point estimate for the marginal effect was 0.069. Next, we tested whether this correlation was 
quantitatively robust to the inclusion of controls for differences in demographic 
characteristics. In column B, we repeated the estimation reported in column A adding a set of 
socioeconomic variables. The point estimate of the marginal effect of numeracy declined 
Wealth = saving balance + long term insurance balance + risky 
investments + real estate investments – mortgage liabilities – other loans 
(1) 
slightly from 0.069 to 0.052, but the coefficient remained statistically significant (p < .001)1. 
The stability of the numeracy effect is remarkable, especially given the fact that the control 
variables in column B are powerful. The Adjusted-R2 of the regression model increased from 
.038 to .217 as we added the set of controls. These covariates are powerful predictors of 
wealth but lead to only a small change in the estimated numeracy effect. Hereafter we will 
refer to this model as the baseline specification. Next, to evaluate the sensitivity of the results 
to changes in the wealth and numeracy specification, we estimated the baseline model with 
levels of wealth and numeracy. We again see that numeracy has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on wealth. The results of these estimations are reported in Appendix C.     
 These results suggest that there is a statistically significant and economically relevant 
correlation between numeracy and wealth. The point estimates indicate that, conditional on 
measures of income, age, education, occupation, and basic demographic characteristics, a one 
point increase in the numeracy score of the respondent is associated with 5.2 percent more 
personal wealth.   
Evaluating alternative measures for numeracy 
 We next evaluated whether numeracy was important over and above intelligence when 
it comes to the relationship with wealth. The LISS panel has not implemented any of the well-
known intelligent tests. However, they asked a sample of panel members to complete the 
CRT that, in other samples, is well correlated with measures of cognitive ability (Frederick 
2005; Obrecht, Chapman, & Gelman, 2009). Among the 212 subjects who completed both 
tests, the correlation between numeracy and the CRT was positive (r = .420, p < .001), but the 
variables were not collinear in the regression analysis (Model column C, VIF for the CRT = 
1.08). To assess the predictive content of cognitive ability, we added the CRT scores to the 
                                                            
1 Consistent with previous literature we find that demographic characteristics such as having more income, 
having a university degree, being older or living with a partner are associated with having more wealth on 
average (Bomberger, 1993; Greenwood, 1987; Keister, 2000) 
baseline specification. To preserve sample size and allow the comparability with the baseline 
model, we also included a variable to indicate whether a CRT score was available for the 
respondent. For those who had no score, we substituted the mean of the rest of the sample. 
This strategy to handle missing data is known as single-value imputation or mean imputation 
(Arminger, Clogg, & Sobel, 1995; Cohen & Cohen, 1975). Estimations are presented in Table 
2 in column C. 
Table 2. Regression analyses examining the relationship between numeracy and wealth, 
alternative measures of numeracy and control variables 
 A B-Baseline C 1D 2D 














M-CRT   0.116* 
(0.057) 
  
















































Occupation      


























Adj. R-Square 0.038 0.218 0.220 .275 .276 
# of obs 1019 1019 1019 212 212 
Note. Entries are regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01. Omitted 
categories: male, not having a partner, low education (primary and lower secondary education), and 
other occupations. M-CRT functions as a missing-indicator coded 1 if a CRT score was available for 
the respondent, 0 otherwise. Missing-indicators compares whether observations with missing values 
differ from observations with non-missing values on variables where information is not missing. 
  The point estimate of the coefficient on the CRT was economically large — correctly 
answering one more of the three questions on the CRT is associated with 6.3% more wealth – 
but was not statistically significant (p = .184). Adding this measure reduced the estimated 
coefficient on numeracy by 0.002. As a robustness check, in column 1D, we repeated the 
baseline specification restricting attention to the 212 (20.8%) panel members who completed 
the numeracy and the CRT test. In this smaller sample, the point estimate on numeracy 
remained statistically different from zero (b = 0.069, SE = 0.025, t = 2.501, p < .013). In 
column 2D, we added the CRT scores to the baseline specification. As a result, the magnitude 
of the coefficient on numeracy declined (by 0.009) but it was statistically significant.  
These results suggest that the observed correlation between numeracy and wealth is 
not explained by the correlation between numeracy and the CRT. Numeracy has a unique 
effect on the accumulation of wealth that is not explained by the respondents’ general 
cognitive ability. The findings also indicate that numeracy is not acting as a proxy of the 
respondents’ cognitive ability and that the CRT cannot be used as a simple substitute for 
numeracy for the purposes of explaining wealth. 
Evaluating alternative explanations for the correlation 
 We found an economically relevant and statistically significant correlation between 
numeracy and wealth. Additionally, we showed that intelligence (measured with the CRT) 
was not a substitute for numeracy. This lends a basic level of support to the idea that 
numeracy robustly and independently explains differences in wealth. However, the correlation 
between numeracy and wealth may be due to a correlation between numeracy and other 
factors, so far unexamined. We next studied whether the positive effects of numeracy may be 
due to spurious correlations between numeracy and unexamined preferences, constraints or 
beliefs. We started with the baseline model estimated above (Table 2, column B) and 
introduced a third variable that may account for this observed correlation. If these third 
factors were important sources of the observed correlation between numeracy and wealth, 
then adding them in the regression should have a substantial effect on the estimated numeracy 
coefficients. Results are presented in Table 3.   
Risk preferences. We began by investigating whether the correlation between 
numeracy and wealth was spurious, being a joint effect caused by the variation in risk 
preferences. In column A of Table 3, we repeated the baseline specification reported in 
Column B of Table 2. In column B of Table 3, we added the control for risk preferences. To 
preserve sample size, we also included a variable to indicate whether the respondent 
completed the question about risk preferences (45.9% of the respondents did). If not, we set 
their score to the sample mean. The point estimate on this measure indicates that risk 
preference was negatively associated with wealth but the coefficient was not statistically 
significant (b = -0.007, SE = 0.015, t = -0.445, p = .656). Moreover, the inclusion of a 
measure of risk preferences leaves the estimated coefficient on numeracy unchanged. We thus 
find no evidence that this measure of risk preferences explains the relationship between 
numeracy and wealth. Numeracy has an effect on wealth that it is not explained by 






Table 3. The robustness of the relation between numeracy and wealth to the inclusion of 
controls in a series of regression analyses. 
 A B C D E 1F 2F G 
















Risk preferences  -0.007 (0.015)      
-0.006 
(0.015) 
M-Risk preferences  -0.071 (0.047)      
-0.066 
(0.048) 
Sufficient income    0.073 (0.103)     
0.025 
(0.108) 
M-Sufficient income   0.145 (0.208)     
0.283 
(0.238) 
Financial knowledge    0.053* (0.021)    
0.066** 
(0.022) 
M-Fin. knowledge     0.012 (0.105)    
0.107 
(0.122) 
Need for cognition     0.011 (0.028)   
-0.002 
(0.029) 
M-Need for cog.     -0.185 (0.217)   
-0.180 
(0.238) 
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Adj. R-Square 0.218 0.218 0.217 0.221 0.217 0.223 0.227 0.232 
# of obs 1019 1019 1019 1019 1019 954 954 954 
Note. Entries are regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01. Omitted 
categories: male, not having a partner, low education (primary and lower secondary education), and 
other occupations. M-Risk preferences, M-Future income, M-Financial knowledge and M-Need for 
cognition function as missing-indicators coded 1 if the score was available for the respondent, 0 
otherwise. 
 Beliefs about minimum sufficient income. Standard lifecycle models predict that 
beliefs about future income may affect household wealth levels (Salm, 2006; Carroll, 1994; 
for an example of savings and expectations see Lindqvist, 1981). The LISS panel collects 
limited information about respondents’ beliefs, but the survey does ask questions about the 
amount of income respondents think would be necessary to maintain their lifestyle. We can 
therefore use these data to evaluate the extent to which the correlation between numeracy and 
wealth is attributable to a correlation between numeracy and some beliefs about income that 
influence wealth. In Column C we report the estimates after adding the control for beliefs 
about minimum income. To preserve sample size, we also included a variable to indicate 
whether the respondent completed the question assessing the beliefs about income (98.7% of 
the respondents did). If not, we set their score to the sample mean. The coefficient on beliefs 
about income was positive, suggesting that a higher expectation of the minimum income 
necessary to live is associated with higher wealth, however was not statistically significant (b 
= 0.073, SE = 0.103, t = 0.704, p = .482). The estimated coefficient on numeracy decreased 
very slightly (by 0.001). We find no evidence that a relationship between numeracy and 
unobserved beliefs about income drives the correlation between numeracy and wealth.   
 Financial Knowledge. The purpose of financial education is to acquire the knowledge 
and skills necessary to manage financial resources effectively (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007). It 
seems likely that the understanding of financial matters and numeracy would draw on the 
same skills of analysis. Hence, numeracy might be a proxy measure for financial knowledge. 
In column D we report the estimates after we added the control for financial knowledge. 
Again, to preserve sample size, we included a variable to indicate whether the respondent 
completed the questions about financial knowledge (94.7% completed). Comparing the 
estimates from this model specification with the baseline model, we see that adding 
participants’ financial understanding decreased the estimated coefficient on numeracy only 
modestly (by 0.001). In this way, we find little evidence that people’s perception of their 
efficacy to deal with financial knowledge is driving the correlation between numeracy and 
wealth. Financial knowledge has an effect on wealth that is statistically significant and 
economically relevant (b = 0.053, SE = 0.021, t = 2.501, p = .013) but that is independent of 
the effect of numeracy. Numeracy is correlated with wealth independent of the individual’s 
perception of his or her financial knowledge.    
Need for cognition. It is possible that wealth accumulation requires not only having 
the skills to understand the different financial alternatives but also the motivation to engage in 
an active search and understanding, which is assessed by NFC. If this is the case, numeracy 
will be a necessary but not sufficient condition for wealth accumulation. For example, it is 
possible that a person high in numeracy but low in need for cognition would not necessarily 
ask questions about interest rates (numerical information), and might end up accepting a 
credit with a very high interest rate. If the effect of numeracy depends on people’s NFC, 
adding this factor to the regression should reduce the observed effect of numeracy.     
In column E we added the NFC measure to the baseline specification. To preserve 
sample size, we included a variable to indicate whether the respondent completed the NFC 
questions (98.8% completed). If not, we set their score to the sample mean. This measure, 
itself, had little power to predict wealth levels and including it has virtually no effect on the 
coefficient on numeracy (decreased by 0.001). Thus, we find no evidence that a relationship 
between numeracy and need for cognition qualifies the correlation between numeracy and 
wealth. 
Financial advisor. Some people consult an expert advisor before making financial 
decisions. Presumably, financial advisors have more information and more experience than a 
lay person and therefore their clients should obtain better financial outcomes. We next studied 
whether the positive correlation between numeracy and wealth could be explained by people 
high in numeracy seeking for more financial advice than people low in numeracy. This would 
mean that numeracy is correlated with the probability of seeking financial advice and having 
financial advice is correlated with accumulating more wealth. If this is the case, the observed 
correlation between numeracy and wealth should be economically irrelevant or statistically 
non-significant if we controlled for receiving financial advice when making important 
decisions. In Table 3, column 1F and column 2F, we report the estimates of this analysis.  
 In column 1F we repeated the baseline specification restricting attention to the 954 
(93.6%) panel members who report whether or not they have looked for financial advice 
(Participants are asked to answer yes or no to the question “In deciding what financial product 
to purchase, I would let myself be influenced by an independent financial adviser”). In this 
smaller sample, the point estimate on numeracy remained economically relevant and 
statistically different from zero (b = 0.056, SE = 0.011, t = 5.009, p < .001). In column 2F, we 
added controls for having financial advice, which leaves the estimated coefficient on 
numeracy unchanged. We interpret this to indicate that the correlation between numeracy and 
wealth cannot be attributed to people with high numeracy obtaining more financial advice 
than people with low numeracy.   
 Finally, in column G, we added all control variables together. The point estimate on 
numeracy remained economically relevant and statistically different from zero (b = 0.055, 
SE= 0.011, t = 4.841, p < .001), and decreased very slightly (by 0.001) as compared to the 
base model in column 1F. We thus find no evidence that measures of risk preferences, beliefs 
about future income, financial knowledge, need for cognition or seeking financial advice 
explained the relationship between numeracy and wealth.   
 
Evaluating the effect of numeracy on wealth accumulation over time  
 We found an economically relevant and statistically significant correlation between 
numeracy and wealth. We demonstrated that this correlation is robust to the inclusion of 
controls for risk preferences, beliefs about future income, financial knowledge, need for 
cognition or seeking financial advice, and that general measures of cognitive ability were not 
substitutes for numeracy. We now turn to explore whether numeracy is related to the wealth 
accumulation trajectories that people follow over time. To examine individual changes in 
wealth, we used the latent growth-curve methodology. The analysis was carried out in two 
steps. First, we modeled the trajectory of each individual using two parameters: a person-
specific intercept (the initial wealth status) and a person-specific slope (rate of change in 
wealth), and tested whether these parameters varied between individuals. Second, we tested 
whether numeracy has a significant effect on the rate of change. We used standard statistical 
methods that have been developed for estimating individual growth curve parameters using 
multilevel model of change, and followed the notation and procedure proposed by Singer and 
Willett (2003). We first describe the models and then present the results.  
Growth Model A: unconditional growth model. 
Growth Model A models wealth only as a function of initial wealth and rate of 
change. The basic statistical model can be represented as follows. 
 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾00 + 𝛾10𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + (𝜀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁0𝑖 +  𝜁1𝑖𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖)  







In equation 2, Wealth𝑖𝑖 refers to the wealth (log-transformed) of an individual i at 
time j. 𝛾00 is the intercept, which is defined as an individual’s wealth when time equals zero 
(year 2007) or the individual’s initial status. 𝛾10 is the rate of change in wealth for individual i 
(2) 
with increasing time. The residuals 𝜁0𝑖 and 𝜁1𝑖 represent the portion of initial status and rate of 
change that remains unexplained. 𝜀𝑖𝑖 represents variations in estimating growth within 
individuals. 
Growth Model B: adding the between-subjects predictors. 
 In Growth Model B we add a number of predictors: age, living with a partner (coded 
1=yes, 0=no), achieved higher education (coded 1=yes, 0=no), net annual income (log-
transformed), female (coded 1=female, 0=male), numeracy and the cross level interaction 
between numeracy and the growth rate. This model can be formulated as follows.   
𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑖𝑖 =  𝛾00 +  𝛾01𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑁𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑖 + 𝛾02𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑖𝑖  +  𝛾03𝐹𝑊𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖 +
𝛾04𝑃𝑊𝑁𝑊𝑃𝑊𝑁𝑊𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾05𝐻𝐻𝐴ℎ𝐸𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝐻𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾06𝐿𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑃𝑁𝐸𝑁𝑊𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾10𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 +
 𝛾11𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑁𝑊𝑁𝑁𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 + �𝜀𝑖𝑖 + 𝜁0𝑖 +  𝜁1𝑖𝑅𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖� 







Results of fitting the multilevel models for change to data. 
We started our analysis by examining whether a change took place in respondents’ 
wealth over time. This first analysis focuses on determining whether there is statistically 
significant variation in individuals’ initial wealth status (wealth in 2007) or in the rate of 
change in wealth to justify further investigation. Therefore, we concentrate the attention on 
examining the variance components or random effects of Growth Model A represented in 
equation 2. The lower part of Table 4 presents these results. The random effects from both the 
intercept (𝜎02 = 0.646, p < .001) and linear growth rate (𝜎12 = 0.032, p < .001) were 
significantly different from zero, indicating that there are substantial individual differences 
with respect to both the initial level and rate of change of wealth over this 5-year period. This 
result gave us confidence to continue with further investigation.   
(3) 
Table 4. Multilevel models examining the relationship between numeracy and the change of 













































































      
































Note. Entries are regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01. Omitted 
categories: male, not having a partner, low education (primary and lower secondary education), and 
other occupations. Low numeracy: 1 SD below the mean, High numeracy: 1 SD above the mean. 
Model A: SPSS procedure MIXED models, REML. Model B: SPSS procedure MIXED models, ML. 
 
We added a set of predictors to explain the observed differences in respondents’ initial 
status and growth trajectories; we are principally interested in the effect of numeracy on the 
growth rate. Growth Model B of table 4 presents the estimates of the enriched model 
described by equation 3. The interaction between numeracy and the rate of change was 
statically significant (𝛾11 R = 0.014, p < .001), indicating that the rate of change vary as a 
function of numeracy. To understand the nature of this relation, we calculated the simple 
slopes between wealth and rate of change at high and low values of numeracy (defined as plus 
and minus one standard deviation around the mean of numeracy). Results from these analysis 
revealed that, for this time period, wealth tends to decrease over time for individuals with low 
numeracy (1 SD below the mean; 𝛾10 = -0.055, p < .001) but stays constant for individuals 
with high numeracy (1 SD above the mean; 𝛾10 = 0.012, p = .427). Results are presented in 
the last two columns of Table 4. Growth Model B is the most parsimonious model of a 
sequence of exploratory models that were fitted to the data; parameter estimates, their 
associated tests and model fit statistics are presented in Appendix D. 
Discussion 
This article contributes evidence relevant for several important questions regarding the 
relationship between numeracy and wealth. Using data from a large representative sample of 
the Dutch population, we find an economically significant correlation between numeracy and 
wealth, even after the inclusion of controls for differences in preferences, constraints, and 
beliefs. Including these factors in the regression analysis only slightly reduced the observed 
correlation (maximum reduction in the point estimate was of 0.002 going from 0.052 to 
0.050). In addition, we present tentative evidence that cognitive ability is not a substitute for 
numeracy for the purpose of explaining wealth. Numeracy explains differences in wealth that 
cannot be explained by differences in participants’ intelligence. Finally, we demonstrate that 
numeracy is a key determinant of the wealth accumulation trajectories that people follow over 
time. Over a 5-year period, while participants with low numeracy tend to decumulate wealth, 
participants with high numeracy tend to maintain a constant level of wealth.  
These findings extend previous studies in different ways. First, they demonstrate that 
the effect of numeracy on wealth is not sensitive to the inclusion of controls for risk 
preferences, beliefs about future income, financial knowledge, need for cognition or seeking 
financial advice. Although previous studies documented the existence of this correlation, 
these were limited due to an identification problem. It was unclear whether numeracy was 
directly correlated with wealth or whether numeracy was correlated with a third factor, so far 
unobserved, that was correlated with financial outcomes. Whereas it is not feasible to control 
for all possible factors affecting wealth, and that other unobserved variables are missing in 
our analysis, we considered factors that have been recognized as strong determinants in the 
wealth literature. We found clear indications that differences in individuals’ numerical 
abilities, rather than more standard sources of heterogeneity, explain important variation in 
wealth.   
Second, we estimate the economic value of the correlation. Numeracy is ultimately of 
importance to economics to the extent that it could meaningfully impact economic outcomes. 
Our estimates suggest that a one-point increase in the numeracy score of the respondent is 
associated with 5 percent more wealth on average. Relative to other wealth determinants this 
effect is not trivial. For example, in standard deviation terms, the effect of numeracy (Beta = 
0.15) is of similar magnitude as the effect of income (Beta = 0.22) or the effect of having a 
university degree (Beta = 0.13). Overall, we think this result highlights the economic 
importance of the relationship between numeracy and wealth.  
Finally, we reveal that the relationship between numeracy and wealth is robust for 
both younger and older adults. Previous studies only looked at populations closer to 
retirement and it was unknown whether similar effects would be observed in younger 
populations. Older and younger adults face different consumption and saving incentives. 
Younger adults generally discount the importance of saving with the idea that they will have 
more opportunities in the future. However, we found that also in this population, participants 
with higher numeracy on average have more wealth -they save more- than participants with 
low numeracy.  
Final remarks and conclusion 
Numeracy has been shown to be significantly related with financial decisions and 
financial outcomes. However, the causal mechanisms at work are still under investigation. 
The direct path between numeracy and wealth may arise through a variety of mechanisms. 
First, numeracy might capture aspects of decision-making ability that are very well correlated 
with the economic choices that lead to wealth accumulation. People with high numeracy 
might for example be more consistent or prudent on their financial decisions. Both of these 
factors have shown to be related with wealth accumulation (Noussair et al., 2013; Choi et al., 
2014). Second, it is possible that people with high numeracy are more successful in their 
education, and therefore stay at school longer and achieve more educational qualifications, 
which can give access to higher-paying occupations. Third, people with high numeracy might 
auto select themselves into employments were they acquire superior financial knowledge. 
Financial expertise can help one to make more optimal financial decisions, resulting in better 
financial outcomes. However, these interpretations are tentative until future research allows a 
more concrete investigation into some of the causal mechanisms at work.  
In summary, we provide empirical evidence on the economic significance of 
numeracy on wealth. We revealed that the correlation between numeracy and wealth is 
statistically significant and economically relevant even after controlling for differences in risk 
preferences, beliefs about future income, financial knowledge, need for cognition or seeking 
financial advice. Additionally, we demonstrate that numeracy is a key determinant of the 
wealth accumulation (or decumulation) trajectory that people follow over a 5-year period. 
Appendix A 
LISS panel data: studies and variables used 
Study No Name of the study Variables 
1 Background variables (December 2007, 
December 2009, and December 2011) 
Gender, age, education, work 
status, income, and education 
9 Assets: LISS Core Study (wave 1, wave 2, 
and wave 3) 
Total balance in checking and 
saving accounts, stocks, bonds 
and other financial assets, real 
estate, mortgages, and loans 
33 Disease prevention Numeracy scale 
49 Commercial opportunities Risk attitude (financial) 
81 Testing mechanisms for identifying true 
risk preferences 
Cognitive Reflection Test  
52 Are effective emotion regulation strategies 
associated with financial capability? 
Financial advisor 
68 Financial literacy Financial knowledge 
10 Income: LISS Core Study (wave 1) Future income 
7 Personality: LISS Core Study (wave 1) Need for cognition  
 
All LISS data sets used in this study are freely available for academic researchers, and may be 
obtained from the LISS data archive: http://www.lissdata.nl/dataarchive/. The first author can 
provide information about the elaborations on the data sets. 
  
Appendix B  
Distribution of numeracy scores in the sample 







1 Imagine that we roll a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 
1,000 rolls, how many times do you think the die would come 
up even (2, 4, or 6)? In ... out of 1000 times. 
 
500 70.2 
2 In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a 
$10.00 prize are 1%. What is your best guess about how many 
people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each buy a 
single ticket from BIG BUCKS? 
 
10 82.2 
3 In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of 
winning a car is 1 in 1,000. What percent of tickets of ACME 
PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? ...% of the tickets 
 
0.1 61.7 
4 Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of 
getting a disease? (1:1 in 100, 2:1 in 1000, 3:1 in 10) 
 
3 79.5 
5 Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a 
disease? (1:1%, 2:10%, 3:5%) 
 
2 82.6 
6 If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and 
Person B’s risk is double that of A’s, what is B’s risk? 
 
2% 87.2 
7 If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten 




8 If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people 
would be expected to get the disease? Out of 100...people will 
get the disease 
 
10 93 
9 If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people 
would be expected to get the disease? Out of 1000...people 
will get the disease 
 
100 92.2 
10 If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would 
be the same as having a ... % chance of getting the disease. 
 
20 78.3 
11 The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 
people, about how many of them are expected to get infected? 
... out of 10,000 people 
5 67.2 















Robustness checks of the baseline model 
In order to test the robustness of results to changes in the functional form of wealth 
and numeracy, we estimated the baseline model (defined in the main article in Column B 
Table 2) with different model specifications. In all specifications we find evidence that 
numeracy is positively and statistically significantly correlated with wealth, while controlling 
for other demographic, socio-economic and individual characteristics. Table C.1 below 
presents the results of these estimations.  
First, to reduce the importance of extreme outliers, we drop twenty respondents that 
represent the top and bottom half of one percent of the wealth distribution. Results are 
presented in column A. In column B we restrict our sample to individuals who report being 
the main financial decision maker. Next, to evaluate the sensitivity of the results to the 
numeracy continuous specification, in Column C we estimate the regression in levels of 
numeracy. The sample was divided into two groups based on a median split of the numeracy 
scores. In addition, two models examine the effect of changes in the specification of the 
wealth function. In column D we restrict the function of wealth to financial wealth and thus 
real estate investments and mortgages liabilities were not included. Financial wealth is a more 
liquid concept than total wealth, since an individual’s home is difficult to convert into cash in 
the short term. It reflects the resources that may be immediately available for consumption or 
various forms of investments. To evaluate the sensitivity of the results to the log specification, 
in Column E we estimate the regression in levels of wealth. The sample was divided into 
three quartiles based on the raw scores of wealth. Participants that score in the bottom 25 
percent were placed in the low category, those that score in the top 25 percent were classified 
in the high category and those that score in the middle 50 percent correspond to the moderate 
category. Order logistic regression was performed to take into account the ordinal data 
structure. 
Table C.1. Baseline model estimated with different specifications for numeracy or wealth, 
interaction terms and subsamples  
 A B C D E 









































































Occupation      





























Adjusted R-Square  0.201 0.217 0.215 0.200 NA 
# of obs 999 713 1019 1005 1019 




















Note. Entries in Column A, B, C and D are regression coefficients. Entries in Column E are 




Sequence of exploratory multilevel models examining the relationship between 
numeracy and the change of wealth 
 Singer and Willett (2003) recommend fitting a systematic sequence of models in 
which each model extends or reduces a prior model in some sensible way. Inspection and 
comparison of its elements are used to determine the most parsimonious model that can 
address the research question. Two models were fitted in addition to Growth-Model B 
reported in the main article. Below we compare these two models against each other and 
against Growth-Model B. Estimated parameters, model fit statistics and deviance tests are 
presented below in Table D.1. Our strategy was to first fit an extended model where all 
predictors were included and test whether reducing the model by excluding non-significant 
predictors significantly worsens the fit of the model. We use the deviance test to examine 
whether the reduced model fit is significantly “worse” than the more complex model.  
Growth-Model D includes numeracy, age, living with a partner (coded 1=yes, 0=no), 
achieved higher education (coded 1=yes, 0=no), net annual income (log-transformed), and 
female (coded 1=female, 0=male) as predictors of both initial status and change. Growth-
Model C includes the same predictors of initial status but only numeracy and age as predictors 
for change. Growth-Model B includes the same predictors of initial status but only numeracy 
as a predictor for change; it is the same model reported in the main article (Table 4). Model 
comparison showed that the more parsimonious Growth-Model B does not fit significantly 











Fixed effects     

















































 Female by Rate -0.039 (0.026)  
 
 
 Age by Rate -0.002* (0.001) 
-0.002* 
(0.001)  
 Partnered by Rate -0.037 (0.028)   
 High Education by Rate 0.021 (0.027)   
 Log Income by Rate 0.083* (0.047)   
Random effects     




















Goodness-of-fit     
Deviance  (df)  5142.258 (18) 5147.333 (14) 5151.226 (13) 
Comparison model: ∆Deviance (df)  D: 5.07(4) C: 3.89*(1) 
Note. Entries are regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p < .01. Omitted 
categories: male, not having a partner, low education (primary and lower secondary education), and 
other occupations. Model A: SPSS procedure MIXED models, REML. Model B: SPSS procedure 
MIXED models, ML. 
  
CHAPTER 3 























This chapter is based on: Estrada-Mejia, C., Peters, E., Zeelenberg, M., De Vries, M., Baker, 
D.P., & Dieckmann, N. (2015). Numeracy and wealth: A study from the Quechua population 
of Peru. Working paper. 
Abstract 
 
Studies conducted in North America and Western Europe have documented a positive 
correlation between numeracy and wealth accumulation. However, little research has 
examined whether this relation extends to simpler financial environments where mathematical 
abilities are presumably less imperative for wealth accumulation. In this paper, we investigate 
whether numeracy also has a positive influence on wealth in an agrarian population from the 
Highlands of Peru, a simpler financial environment where wealth is acquired through 
monetary exchanges, barter and reciprocal labor. Wealth was measured using data on asset 
ownership (e.g., owning a bicycle or radio) and housing characteristics (e.g., type of toilet 
facilities). Result from regression analysis and SEM models revealed that the positive 
correlation between numeracy and wealth was substantial and statistically significant even 
after accounting for differences in fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence, potential 
demographic confounders, and the direct effects of education. These findings contribute to the 
growing research in numeracy by documenting the positive effect of numeracy on wealth in a 











The expanding field of research on numeracy has documented the relationship between 
numeracy and a set of behaviors related to saving, portfolio choice, and wealth. For example, 
individuals with greater numeracy are more likely to participate in financial markets and to 
invest in stocks (Almenber & Widmark, 2011; Christelis, Jappelli, & Padua, 2010), more 
likely to plan for retirement (Lusardi & Mitchell, 2007, 2011), more knowledgeable when 
choosing a mortgage (Disney & Gathergood, 2011), less likely to default on loans (Gerardi, 
Goette, & Meier, 2010), and more likely to avoid predatory loans, pay loans on time, and pay 
credit cards in full (Sinayev & Peters, 2015). Furthermore, research has shown that numeracy 
is positively correlated with wealth, after controlling for a variety of cognitive abilities and 
socioeconomic factors (Banks, O’Dea, & Oldfield, 2011; Banks & Oldfield, 2007; Estrada-
Mejia, de Vries, & Zeelenberg, in preparation; Lusardi, 2012; Smith, McArdle, & Willis, 
2010). Although very informative, previous studies were all conducted with North American 
and Western European populations, where the financial environment is highly complex and 
changing rapidly. In this paper, we test whether numeracy is also associated with wealth in an 
agrarian population, where financial transactions are carried out not only in cash but also by 
barter, reciprocity, and payment in kind, and therefore are presumable less mathematically 
demanding. 
Populations in developed countries face a relatively complex financial world, 
characterized by increasingly sophisticated financial products and services, and growing 
opportunities to personally interact with financial markets. Individuals in these contexts often 
have to deal with numerical information in the form of interest rates, exchange rates, risk 
incidence, base rates, and probabilities. Moreover, to make informed decisions in this 
complex financial context, it is essential for individuals to understand and use this numerical 
information. Objective numeracy refers to the ability to understand and use numeric concepts, 
to perform basic mathematical operations, compare magnitudes, and comprehend ratio 
concepts such as fractions, proportions, percentages and probabilities (Lipkus, Samsa, & 
Rimer, 2001; Peters, 2012; Nelson, Reyna, Fagerlin, Lipkus, & Peters, 2008). Thus, it is not 
surprising in this context that individuals with higher objective numeracy (called numeracy 
from hereon) make better financial decisions and accumulate higher wealth.  
On the contrary, communities in the so-called underdeveloped countries face a 
substantially different financial context, with very limited access to financial alternatives and 
very limited contact with financial markets (World Bank, 2015). Therefore, one might wonder 
whether numeracy is also important in these contexts where the difficulty of the financial 
transactions is relatively low. Specifically, in this study we investigate the question of 
whether numeracy is uniquely associated with wealth in an agrarian population: the Quechua 
people from the highland of Peru. This population can be described as having a self-sufficient 
economy where financial transactions are carried out, not only in cash, but also by barter, 
reciprocity, and payment in kind (Mayer, 2002; Figueroa, 2008).  
It could be argued that, since the complexity of the financial operations is relatively 
low and the economic exchanges are not monetary but based on relationships (e.g., goods 
acquired through barter or reciprocal exchanges), numeracy should be a weaker predictor than 
other factors, such as verbal fluency. Alternatively, it could be argued that numeracy still 
would have an effect on farmers’ wealth through other channels such as influencing farmers’ 
economic preferences, or influencing their reasoning and decision-making processes, in ways 
that favor (or detract from) wealth accumulation.   
The question of whether the relationship between numeracy and wealth extends to 
simpler financial environments, where economic decisions are presumably less 
mathematically demanding, is important because it will further our understanding of the 
determinants of wealth in these less developed economies. In addition, it will inform us about 
the scope of the effects of numeracy. If numeracy is also related to wealth in this context, it 
may indicate that the effect of numeracy on financial behaviors goes beyond facilitating 
calculations and extends to how people reason (see, for example, Peters, Baker, Dieckmann, 
Leon, & Collins, 2010 for a similar argument in a health context). In the General Discussion 
we return to this proposition and address it in light of the results of our studies. Below, we 
describe the financial environments of these small, relatively isolated, agrarian Quechua-
speaking communities in Peru’s Andean highlands. 
Financial environments in the Peruvian Andes and in developed countries 
The highlands of Peru are mainly populated by small farming communities (Figueroa, 
2008). Households get their family income mostly from the exchange of agricultural 
production, livestock production, and labor services. These goods or services are paid to them 
in different ways: food (e.g., potatoes, milk), non-food goods (e.g., handicrafts), other types 
of productive services (e.g., reciprocal labor exchanges), and money. Part of this income is 
consumed in the form of food, clothes, cleaning products, and education; and part is saved or 
invested by acquiring material assets in the form of household durables (e.g., fridge or stove), 
house construction, increasing the stock of animals, or buying fertilizers and pesticides 
(Figueroa, 2008; Mayer & Glave, 1999). They also take loans principally for emergencies, 
such as illnesses or burials. However, interest is normally not charged directly in cash, but 
mostly in services (Figueroa, 2008). For instance, the borrower agrees to help the lender to 
farm his plot with two days of work in a not very distant time period. Credit functions as an 
advance payment of future work. Credit for agricultural working capital (the cash available 
for day-to-day operations of the business) or other purposes is less common (Figueroa, 2008).  
These communities have little or no access to traditional financial services such as 
bank accounts, bank loans, and investment opportunities. For instance, The Global Findex 
report (World Bank, 2015) documented that, during the year 2014, only 23% of the Peruvian 
population (aged 15 years or older and living in rural areas) had a savings account at a bank, 
credit union, or another financial institution (e.g., cooperative, microfinance institution); 
about 7% had saved money in a bank or other type of financial institution; only 10% had 
borrowed any money from a financial institution; and about 3% had used a credit card. 
Although modernization is slowly permeating these communities and new generations are 
more integrated to the modern financial markets, it has been argued that capitalist 
development has had little effect on their economic behavior (Figueroa, 2008; Mayer, 2002). 
We examine the possibility that numeracy nonetheless will be associated with wealth in the 
present study.   
The present study 
In an attempt to provide insight into the association and possible contribution of 
numeracy to wealth, we investigate this question in a convenience sample of an agrarian 
population in Peru. The Quechua population living in the highlands of Peru offered an ideal 
opportunity for carrying out the research. The data were collected in 2009 by a group of 
researchers studying the relationship between health behavior, education, numeracy, and 
intelligence. Although the study was designed to test a different research question, the 
characteristics of the population and the selection of the sample provided us with a unique 
opportunity to test for the relative effect of numeracy on wealth. Previous findings from the 
study have been reported by Dieckmann and colleagues (in press) and Baker and colleagues 
(2015).  
Although the Quechuan adults who were included in the study have similar lifestyles, 
similar post-schooling work experience, and similar parental background, they vary 
considerably in their numeracy skills (see descriptive analyses in the Results section). Our 
primary question is whether numeracy has a unique effect on wealth, over and above the 
potential confounders of intelligence, schooling and social background.   
Method 
Sample. Participants were from the Ancash region of the Peruvian Andes. The sample 
was selected using a two-stage stratified sampling procedure. First, Peru’s National Census 
2007 was used to develop a list of all small agrarian communities within the Carhuaz district 
in the Ancash region. Fourteen communities were selected based on high levels of within-
community variation in educational attainment and, conversely, high levels of homogeneity of 
occupational structure (approximately 50% of the populations in these areas were subsistence-
level farmers or employed in the local agrarian economy). Second, a door-to-door survey was 
conducted to recruit subjects, stratified by education attainment. Only heads of households or 
their partners were included in the present study. We excluded 9 participants who did not 
complete the numeracy test. The final sample consisted of 225 adults. Descriptive statistics of 
the sample are presented in Table 1.  
Table 1. Sample demographics (N = 225)  
Characteristic N (%) 
Age Cohort  
   30-39 70 (31.1) 
   40-49 81 (36.0) 
   50+ 74 (32.8) 
Gender  
   Female 117 (52.0) 
   Male 108 (48.0) 
Mother Tongue  
   Spanish   67 (29.8) 
   Quechua 158 (70.2) 
Residence  
   Urban (Small town) 132 (58.7) 
   Rural 93 (41.3) 
Married or cohabitating 178 (79.1) 
Procedure. Materials were translated from English to Spanish and Quechua 
(participants’ native language) and translated back into English. Interviews were conducted 
one-on-one, in Spanish or Quechua, in private homes or at village school buildings. The study 
instruments were completed in two three-hour sessions spread across two separate days. Half 
of the cognitive ability instruments were completed in each session (along with several 
unrelated tasks and questionnaires). Participants were compensated with household goods 
(e.g., sugar or pasta) and schools in participating villages were given educational materials. 
Measures. 
Wealth. Wealth was assessed using participants’ household durables and housing 
quality. Similar measures were adopted to assess wealth in similar populations (Peters et al., 
2010; Sahn & Stifel, 2000, 2003; Filmer & Pritchett, 2001). The household durables consist 
of indicators of ownership of stereos, TVs, computers, stoves, refrigerators, bicycles, and 
communication devices (cell phone and/or landline). The housing quality includes indicator 
variables for source of drinking water (piped water relative to other sources), toilet facilities 
(flush toilet inside the house relative to no toilet or latrine inside the house), and household 
construction material (indicators for quality of floors). Hereafter, we will refer to both 
household durables and housing characteristics as participants’ assets.  
To construct a wealth index, a factor analysis was conducted on the 14 different assets. 
Three assets (car, motorcycle and radio) had factor loadings below the conventional level of 
0.3, and therefore were excluded. A second factor analysis on the remaining 11 assets showed 
that only one component had an eigenvalue over Kaiser’s criterion of 1. The scree plot also 
suggested retaining only one factor. Given the convergence of the scree plot and Kaiser’s 
criterion, only one factor was retained in the final analysis. Lastly, total wealth scores were 
computed using a regression scoring method. Table 2 presents the factor loadings (only for 
the assets included in the final analysis) and the percentage of participants who owned each of 
the assets.  
Table 2. Factor loadings and prevalence of assets included in the wealth index  
Assets Factor loading Prevalence % 
Housing quality   
Floor made of cement relative to made of earth .718 34.6 
Toilet facilities relative to no toilet inside the house .569 68.7 
Piped water relative to other sources of water .344 86.6 
Household durables   
Stove .811 46.8 
Fridge .651 28.6 
Computer .622 18.2 
TV .661 62.3 
Stereo .628 28.6 
Landline .451 15.0 
Cellphone .436 65.5 
Bike .377 25.9 
Note. Entries are factor loadings and percentage of participants who own the asset. 
Numeracy. Numeracy was assessed using three questions targeting probabilistic 
reasoning. Psychometric analyses using item response theory (IRT) methods revealed that 
only two items had acceptable discrimination and, therefore, only these two items were 
retained. More details of the IRT model are reported in Appendix A. The items retained read 
as follows: 
 1. Imagine you were going to buy a raffle ticket and you had three different raffles to 
choose from? In the first raffle, 1 out of every 100 people wins.  In the second raffle, 1 out of 
every 1000 people wins.  In the third raffle, 1 out of every 10 people wins. Which raffle 
would you rather play? a. 1 in 100; b. 1 in 1000; c. 1 in 10. 
2.  If the chance of winning a raffle is 10%, how many people would you expect to 
win out of 1000? __people. 
The total resulting numeracy score was calculated using the difficulty and 
discrimination parameters estimated from the IRT and rescaled to have a minimum value of 
zero. Higher scores indicate higher levels of numeracy (M = 0.79, SD = 0.62, range from 0 to 
1.63).  
Education. Participants reported their educational attainment by indicating the last 
year of schooling completed (M = 7.33, SD = 4.89, range from 0 to 16). Twelve percent 
(12.4%) of the sample had no formal education. 
Crystallized intelligence. Crystallized verbal abilities and long-term memory was 
assessed with the Peabody Picture of Vocabulary Test (PPVT; Dunn, Padilla, Lugo, & Dunn, 
1986). For each item, the facilitator presents a page with four pictures and then speaks a word 
describing one of the pictures. The participant is asked to point or to say the number of the 
picture that corresponds to the word (M = 73.38, SD = 13.05, range from 11 to 89).  
Fluid intelligence. Fluid intelligence was assessed with four different instruments. All 
four instruments are psychometrically validated and commonly employed in studies of 
cognitive ability. Scores for each independent measure were standardized and added together 
into a compound measure (M standardized score = -0.02, SD = 2.84, range from -6.54 to 
9.81).  
Verbal fluency. Verbal fluency was assessed with the COWAT (Controlled oral word 
association test; Loonstra, Tarlow, & Sellers, 2001), which requires participants to generate 
words within a category (e.g., animals) in a specified amount of time (60 seconds) (M = 
16.46, SD = 4.82, range from 6 to 31). 
Working memory. Working memory capacity was assessed with the backward digits 
task (Wechsler, 1981). In it, participants are presented with a series of numeric digits and are 
asked to repeat them back in reverse order (M = 3.42, SD = 2.05, range from 0 to 10). 
Planning.  The Delis-Kaplan Executive-Function System Tower test was used to 
measure participants’ planning, strategy, working memory, and attention shifting abilities 
(Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Using a board with three vertical pegs and five colored 
disks varying in size from small to large, the participants were asked to move the disks from a 
predetermined starting position to a specified ending position, where better solutions involve 
the most direct and fewest moves (M = 3.61, SD = 1.92, range from 1 to 9). 
Non-verbal reasoning. The Raven Colored Progressive Matrices test was used to 
assess nonverbal reasoning about complexity (Raven, Raven, & Court, 2000). In this task, the 
subject is presented with a series of pattern matrices (2x2, 3x3, or 4x4) and asked to identify 
the missing element that completes each pattern (M = 5.57, SD = 1.97, range from 0 to 9). 
   Control variables. Controls included gender, age, residence (small town, defined as 
100 or more households clustered together, versus rural), marital status (living with a partner 
versus not), and mother tongue (Quechua versus Spanish). Table 3 shows the basic 
descriptive statistics for all measures. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for all measures included in the analysis 
Characteristic Mean SD Min Max N 
Wealth 0 0.93 -1.28 1.76 219 
Numeracy IRT scores  0.79 0.62 0 1.63 224 
Numeracy raw scores 0.97 0.76 0 2 224 
Years of schooling 7.33 4.89 0 16 225 
Fluid intelligence      
   Verbal fluency  16.46 4.82 6 31 224 
   Working memory  3.42 2.05 0 10 225 
   Planning 3.61 1.92 1 9 224 
   Non-verbal reasoning  5.57 1.97 0 9 226 
   Fluid intelligence index -0.02 2.84 -6.54 9.81 223 




First a two-parameter logistic IRT model was used to examine the psychometric 
properties of the numeracy scale. Details about this model are reported in Appendix A. 
Second, we examined correlations between wealth and each of the potential predictors. Next, 
we estimated a series of regression models to provide an initial test of the relationship 
between numeracy and wealth, controlling for several potential confounders. The baseline 
model used numeracy, fluid intelligence, and crystallized intelligence as predictors of wealth. 
The demographic model added gender, age, residence, marital status, and mother tongue to 
the baseline model. The full model added education to the demographic model. After, as an 
additional illustration of the effect of numeracy on wealth, we estimated the probability of 
holding each of the assets from the wealth index (i.e., house durables and housing 
characteristics) using a mixed-effects logistic regression model. Details of the mixed-effects 
model are presented in Appendix B. Finally, structural equation models (SEMs) were used to 
test the effect of educational attainment, numeracy and intelligence measures on wealth. 
Unlike a regression analysis, the SEM approach allows us to model latent constructs that 
explicitly account for measurement error (e.g., Fluid intelligence) and to include educational 
attainment as a simultaneous predictor of numeracy, fluid intelligence, crystallized 
intelligence, and wealth. SEMs were estimated using Stata 14. 
Results 
Descriptive analyses 
Half of the participants were female (52%), 79.1% were married or cohabitating, with 
a mean age of 44.8 years (SD = 8.46, range = 30–60 years); 58.7% lived in a small town, and 
70.2% spoke Quechua as their first language. Participants had completed, on average, an 
elementary school education (M = 7.33 years, SD = 4.89, Range = 0–16 years). Twelve 
percent (12.4%) had no formal schooling, 34.7% had completed all or some primary 
education (6th grade or less), 34.7% had completed some or all of high school, and 18.2% had 
more than a high school education. An inspection of the pairwise correlations showed that 
more years of formal education, greater numeracy, and greater fluid and crystallized 
intelligence were associated with higher wealth (see Table 4).  
Table 4. Correlations between study variables 
Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Wealth          
2. Numeracy  .47**         
3. Years of schooling  .65**  .51**        
4. Fluid intelligence  .46**  .51**  .61**       
5. Crystallized intelligence  .50**  .38**  .64**  .57**      
6. Age  .07 -.02 -.11 -.14* -.03     
7. Gender  .01  .01 -.07 -.09 -.16* -.06    
8. Mother tongue -.42** -.13* -.27** -.12 -.25** -.02  .02   
9. Residence -.63** -.28** -.43** -.28** -.33** -.06  .01  .51**  
10. Married   .09  .06  .07  .15*  .13 -.18** -.21**  .05  .12 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01. Dichotomous variables were coded as follow. Gender (Male = 0, 
Female = 1), Mother Tongue (Spanish = 0, Quechua = 1), Residence (Small Town = 0, Rural 
= 1), Married or cohabitating (No = 0, Yes = 1).  
 
Regression analyses 
Table 5 shows the results of a set of regression analyses modeling wealth. Model 1 
showed that higher scores on numeracy (b = 0.40, SD = 0.10, t = 4.10, p < .001) and other 
cognitive ability measures were significant predictors of greater wealth (bFI = 0.05, SD = 
0.02, t = 1.99, p = .048; bCI = 0.02, SD = 0.01, t = 4.54, p < .001). In Model 2, six control 
variables were included. Living in a small town as opposed to a rural area, speaking Spanish 
as opposed to Quechua, and being married or cohabiting as opposed to being single were all 
associated with higher wealth after controlling for numeracy, fluid intelligence and 
crystallized intelligence. This model also revealed that numeracy (b = 0.27, SD = 0.08, t = 
3.34, p = .001) and the other cognitive ability measures (bFI = 0.05, SD = 0.02, t = 2.40, p = 
.017; bCI = 0.01, SD = 0.005, t = 2.55, p = .012) remained as significant predictors of wealth 
after controlling for these demographic controls. In Model 3, education (years of schooling) 
was included as a predictor. From the cognitive ability measures, only numeracy (bnumeracy = 
0.18, SD = 0.08, t = 2.26, p = .025; bFI = 0.02, SD = 0.02, t = 0.86, p = .392; bCI = 0.002, SD 
= 0.005, t = 0.55, p = .585) remained a significant predictor of wealth after controlling for 
education. One additional model including the interactions of the control variables and 
numeracy revealed no significant interactions (all p > .210). 
Table 5. Linear regression analysis 



















Age  0.01 (0.01) 
0.01** 
(0.005) 
Gender (Male = 0, Female = 1)  0.15 (0.09) 
0.15 
(0.08) 
Mother Tongue (Spanish = 0, Quechua = 1)  -0.26* (0.11) 
-0.24* 
(0.10) 
Residence (Small Town = 0, Rural = 1)  -0.80** (0.11) 
-0.67** 
(0.10) 
Married or cohabitating (No = 0, Yes = 1)   0.28* (0.11) 
0.30** 
(0.10) 
Education   0.07** (0.01) 
Constant -2.07 -1.31 -1.29 
R2 .35 .56 .62 
N 216 216 216 
Note. Entries in table are unstandardized betas (SD); **p < .05, ***< .01. DV = Wealth.  
As an additional illustration, the probability of holding each of the assets (house 
durables and housing characteristics) from the wealth index was estimated using a mixed-
effects logistic regression model (see Table 6). Probabilities were estimated for a typical 
sample responder: a 44-year-old female, living in a rural area, married, whose mother tongue 
is Quechua, and with average scores for fluid intelligence and crystalized intelligence. With 
the exception of owning a bike, the probability of holding each of the assets increases as 
numeracy increases. For instance, whereas the probability of having a stove is 48% for a 
participant with lower numeracy (1 SD below the mean), it is 89% for a highly numerate 
participant (1 SD above the mean). Likewise, whereas the probability of having a toilet 
facility inside the house is 87% for participants with lower numeracy, it is 96% for 
participants with higher numeracy (Probabilities were estimated with the model reported in 
Appendix B).  
Table 6. Predicted probability of holding household durables and housing quality indicators 








Housing quality    
Floor made of cement vs. earth 33.8 53.4 72.1 
Toilet facilities vs. no toilet 87.1 92.4 95.7 
Piped water vs. other 97.2 98.1 98.8 
Household durables    
Stove 48.5 73.0 88.6 
Fridge 23.0 40.9 61.6 
Computer 15.8 24.1 35.1 
TV 81.9 88.6 93.0 
Stereo 31.0 43.9 57.7 
Landline 16.0 19.9 24.6 
Cellphone 88.1 90.4 92.3 
Bike 48.5 41.9 35.7 
Note. Entries are estimated probabilities of holding the asset for a 44-years-old female, living 
in a rural area, married, whose mother tongue is Quechua, and with averages scores for fluid 
intelligence and crystalized intelligence. 
 
Structural equation models (SEMs) 
We then tested different models using an SEM framework that explored whether 
numeracy can be modeled independent of a general fluid intelligence latent variable. The first 
model included the four fluid intelligence factors and numeracy as indicators of a single latent 
cognitive ability factor. In a second model, we explored whether separating numeracy from 
the four fluid intelligence measures resulted in better overall fit. A comparison of the fit 
indexes revealed that the second model, which treated numeracy as an independent construct 
from fluid intelligence, fits better (CFIModel2 = 1.000 > CFIModel1 = 0.987; TLIModel2 = 1.002 > 
TLIModel1 = 0.975; RMSEAModel2 = 0.000 < RMSEAModel1 = 0.047). As a result, we modeled 
numeracy as a factor independent of fluid intelligence.  
Figure 1 presents the initial model used to explore the simultaneous effect of 
education, fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence and numeracy on wealth. The model 
provided an acceptable fit to the data (CFI = 0.979; TLI = 0.970; RMSEA = 0.038). With the 
aim of finding the most parsimonious model, non-significant pathways between predictors, 
control variables, and wealth were removed sequentially based on their respective 
significance levels. The final model (see Figure 2) provided a good fit to the data (CFI = 
0.973; TLI = 0.965; RMSEA = 0.041). Moreover, a likelihood-ratio test comparing the initial 
model and the final model (χ2 (4) = 7.82, p = .098) revealed that our final model (see Figure 
2) is a more parsimonious model that fits as well as our initial model (see Figure 1). Our final 
model revealed that numeracy remained a significant predictor of wealth after accounting for 
all other model effects. In this final model, fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence 








Figure 1. SEM initial model 
Note. * p<.05, **p<.01. The following control variables were included as predictors of wealth 
(not displayed in figure): Age, gender, residence, mother tongue and married. All parameter 
estimates are standardized regression coefficients. 
 
Figure 2. SEM final model  
Note. * p<.05, **p<.01. The following control variables were included as predictors of wealth 
(not displayed in figure): Age, gender, residence, mother tongue and married. All parameter 
estimates are standardized regression coefficients. 
We also tested several alternative models. We first considered whether higher 
numeracy might have led participants to obtain greater schooling; thus, we reversed the 
direction of the pathway between schooling and numeracy, without changing any other 
pathway. The reversed pathway was significant but resulted in a poor-fitting model (CFI = 
0.905; TLI = 0.877; RMSEA = 0.079; BIC = 10056.16). In a similar way, we reversed the 
pathways between schooling and fluid intelligence (CFI = 0.854; TLI = 0.819; RMSEA = 
0.093; BIC = 10105.32) and schooling and crystallized intelligence (CFI = 0.928; TLI = 
0.908; RMSEA = 0.067; BIC = 10038.45). These models also resulted in worse fit. Finally, 
we reversed all pathways between schooling, and numeracy, fluid intelligence and 
crystallized intelligence. In this model, numeracy and the two intelligence measures have a 
direct effect on schooling, and schooling has a direct effect on wealth. This model also 
resulted in a poor-fitting model (CFI = 0.772; TLI = 0.705; RMSEA = 0.123; BIC = 
10112.14). After drawing a comparison of our final model (Figure 2) and these alternative 
models (using the BIC criteria), we found that our final model gives a better fit to the data 
than all of the alternative models (BIC final model = 10012.35 < BIC all alternative models).  
Discussion 
Using data from a field study conducted in 14 agrarian Quechua-speaking 
communities in Peru’s Andean highlands, we explored the extent to which numeracy skills 
were related to wealth. Results from linear regressions and SEM models revealed that 
numeracy had an independent, consistent, and robust effect on wealth. Specifically, the 
relationship between numeracy and wealth was substantial and statistically significant even 
after accounting for differences in fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence, potential 
demographic confounders, and the direct effects of education. Likewise, the likelihood of 
holding each of the assets used to form the wealth index increased as numeracy increased 
(except for owning a bicycle). For instance, an individual with higher numeracy was 38% 
more likely to own a fridge than an individual with equal demographic characteristics and 
intelligent measures but lower numeracy. Taken together, these findings provide additional 
support for the unique and independent role of numeracy in wealth accumulation. Moreover, 
the findings presented are strengthened by the fact that the sample was selected to be fairly 
homogenous in terms of lifestyle, parental education, post-schooling work experiences, and 
access to financial services. Therefore, these factors are unlikely to have accounted for our 
results.  
One important contribution of the research reported in this paper lies in the fact that it 
was carried out in a community that is very different from previous research settings, which 
have focused primarily on North America and Europe. Nonetheless, in this relatively less 
financially developed economy, numeracy was also an important predictor of wealth. Then, 
even in this relatively less complex financial environment that makes fewer mathematical 
demands on individuals, numeracy still plays a clear role in predicting wealth.  
It has been a common belief that people’s numeracy goes beyond the capacity to 
calculate, and that it is systematically related to reasoning, risk and time preferences, and the 
level of motivation to attend to and elaborate upon numerical information (Peters, 2012). We 
think that it is through these mechanisms that numeracy is related to the wealth accumulation 
of these farmers. For instance, individuals with higher numeracy tend to be less impatient, 
preferring larger delayed rewards over smaller immediate rewards (Benjamin, Brown, & 
Schapiro, 2013). This patience is relevant to wealth accumulation because impatient people 
persistently report having lower savings (Hasting & Mitchell, 2011). 
 Numeracy is also related to risk preferences. Individuals with higher numeracy are 
more likely to take strategic risks, that is, to prefer a risky alternative when it is advantageous 
to do so and avoided it when it is not (Pachur & Galesic, 2013; Jasper, Bhattacharya, Levin, 
Jones, & Bossard, 2013). Moreover, this “strategic” risk management strategy has been 
shown to relate to higher earnings (Jasper et al., 2013). Farmers are frequently exposed to 
uncertainties such as changes in prices and weather conditions, plagues, and availability of 
labor and machinery. Although these risks are not under the control of the farmers, they can 
develop strategies to cope with them. For instance, the farmer may keep a stock of spare parts 
for the farm machinery to minimize risks of breakdowns or he may maintain a good 
relationship with the neighbors to assure their help in case of emergency. We expect farmers 
with higher numeracy to be more prone to use some kind of risk management strategy, which 
in turn reduces the variability in productivity and profitability and allows better planning and 
higher savings. 
Finally, individuals with higher numeracy have shown to be better able to integrate 
multiple types of numeric information (Peters, Dieckmann, Västfjäll, Mertz, Slovic, & 
Hibbard, 2009), to have greater motivation to attend to numerical information (Peters, 
Västfjäll, Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, & Dickert, 2006), to remember numbers better (García-
Retamero & Galesic, 2011), and to draw more affective meaning from numbers (Peters et al., 
2006). Farmers are exposed to numerical information in the form of input prices, output 
prices and yields, as well as other technical data. We expected farmers with higher numeracy 
to attend more to these important numbers and use them more effectively in decisions (Peters 
et al., 2006; Dieckmann, Slovic, & Peters, 2009; Peters, Hart, & Fraenkel, 2011).  
Numerous researchers have suggested that an inextricable covariation exists between 
schooling, intelligence, and numeracy. Moreover, it has been documented that both schooling 
and intelligence are correlated with wealth. Here, we provide evidence that numeracy is also 
associated with wealth. But are these three effects independent? A major shortcoming of the 
research on numeracy and wealth is that only a few earlier studies had controlled for general 
cognitive ability. In order to have a more robust test, we included measures of both fluid and 
crystallized intelligence. Although the findings presented here are consistent with the results 
reported in the extant literature, controlling for properly validated intelligence measures 
allows us to better advocate for a robust effect of numeracy on wealth, over and above other 
cognitive abilities and in a relatively homogenous population that, by its nature, controls for 
many of the sources of heterogeneity that exist in more developed countries (e.g., parental 
wealth saved in the stock market or bank that is passed down to children).  
Finally, these findings are of relevance since a number of communities in the so-called 
underdeveloped countries often face financial environments that are similar to our Peruvian 
sample. Although these results need to be replicated in other populations in order to have a 
better understanding of the relationship between numeracy and wealth, our findings provide 
tentative evidence that the positive association holds true even in populations with less 
developed financial contexts. However, the fact that this population did not hold traditional 
financial products should not be understood as wealth accumulation being less important. 
Rather, wealth is accumulated in a different way through assets. Similar to the findings from 
traditional measures of wealth, higher wealth in these agrarian and less financially 
sophisticated communities has been related to important well-being outcomes such as better 








IRT analysis of the numeracy scale 
Numeracy was assessed with three items modified from Lipkus, Samsa, and Rimer 
(2001) and designed to measure participants’ probabilistic reasoning. Items are of the form of 
mathematical problems with a unique correct response. Each correct response is given a score 
of 1 and incorrect response a score of 0. Respondents answered the 3 items in the same order 
as presented below. Table A.1 presents the percentage of correct responses per item. 
Item 1: Imagine you were going to buy a raffle ticket and you had three different 
raffles to choose from? In the first raffle, 1 out of every 100 people wins.  In the second raffle, 
1 out of every 1000 people wins.  In the third raffle, 1 out of every 10 people wins. Which 
raffle would you rather play? a. 1 in 100; b. 1 in 1000; c. 1 in 10 
Item 2: Imagine that 10 men and 20 women put their names on little pieces of paper 
and put them in a hat.  If the papers were all mixed up, and you picked a name out of the hat 
without looking, do you think it would be the name of a woman or a man? a. man; b. woman 
Item 3: If the chance of winning a raffle is 10%, how many people would you expect 
to win out of 1000? Answer __people 
 
Before presenting the results of the IRT analysis, let us first explain why an IRT 
analysis was valuable for this research. We conceptualize numeracy as a continuous variable 
that ranges from very low to very high. Although we cannot directly observe participants’ 
numeracy, we can infer participants’ ability through their responses to a set of mathematical 
questions. Following a classical test theory approach, participants’ numerical ability could be 
assessed by counting the number of correct responses. However, this approach is limited 
because items in the questionnaire may differ on their difficulty and on their capacity to 
discriminate between individuals with lower and higher numeracy. Consider, for example, the 
hypothetical responses of two participants, Juan and Pedro, who both answered only 1 of the 
questions correct. Juan, however, answered one of the “easy” questions correctly whereas 
Pedro correctly answered one of the “difficult” questions. Counting the number of correct 
responses would give Juan and Pedro the same score of one. Alternatively, weighting their 
responses by the difficulty and the discrimination capacity of the items would result in 
different total scores. IRT research has shown that weighted IRT scores better reflect the 
location of each of these participants along the numerical ability continuum (de Ayala, 2009).  
Specifically, the difficulty parameter captures the location of the item along the 
numeracy continuum. In general, items located below zero are said to be “easy” and items 
above zero are “hard” (de Ayala, 2009). The discrimination parameter refers to how well the 
item differentiates between people with higher and lower numerical ability. Items with a high 
discrimination parameter are such that individuals with higher numeracy select the correct 
answer more often than individuals with lower numeracy.  
A two-parameter logistic IRT model was estimated using the irtoys package for R. 
The item difficulty and the discrimination parameters are presented in Table A.1, Model A. 
An inspection of these estimates indicated that Item 2, with a negative discrimination 
parameter (Discrimination = -0.47) was inconsistent—participants with lower numeracy had a 
higher probability of answering the question correctly than those with higher numeracy. IRT 
theory suggests that items with negative discrimination parameters should be recoded or 
discarded (de Ayala, 2009). This item was not included in further analysis. 
Next, the IRT model was estimated for the two items that remained. The difficulty and 
discrimination parameters are presented in Table A.1, Model B. The difficulty parameters 
indicated that Item 1 (Difficulty = -0.47) was relatively easier than Item 3 (Difficulty = 0.64). 
On the other hand, the discrimination parameters revealed that Item 1 (Discrimination = 1.36) 
could differentiate better between participants located at different locations of the numeracy 
continuum than Item 3 (Discrimination = 1.29). 
Table A.1. Percentage of correct responses to the numeracy items and parameters estimated 
with IRT models  
  IRT Model A IRT Model B 
Item Correct responses Discrimination Difficulty Discrimination Difficulty 
1 138 (61.6%) 1.67 -0.42 1.36 -0.47 
2 57 (25.5%) -0.47 -2.42   
3 78 (34.8%) 1.09 0.71 1.29 0.64 
 
Total scores were calculated using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
approach. MLE can be used to consider, not only whether the respondent answered each item 
correctly, but to weight the answer by the item’s difficulty and discrimination parameters 
(Embretson & Reise, 2000). As a result of combining information on the respondent’s entire 
pattern of responses as well as the characteristics of each item, MLE can provide many more 
distinctions among respondents than just counting the number of correct responses 
(Embretson & Reise, 2000; Van der Linden & Hambleton, 1997). Table A.2 contains the four 
possible response patterns, their frequency of occurrence and the corresponding total 
numeracy score. We rescaled the IRT scores by setting the minimum score to zero. In this 
way participants who answered both questions wrong received a total score of zero. 
Table A.2. Response patterns for two numeracy items, frequencies of occurrence and 







rescaled (Min = 0) 
Item 1 and Item 4 incorrect 68 (30.4%) -0.79 0 
Item 1 correct and Item 4 incorrect 78 (34.8%) 0.05 0.84 
Item 1 incorrect and Item 4 correct 18 (8.0%) 0.00 0.79 
Item 1 and Item 4 correct 60 (26.8%) 0.84 1.63 
Appendix B 
Estimated probabilities of holding an asset from the wealth index 
 The probability of holding each of the assets (house durables and housing 
characteristics) from the wealth index was estimated using a mixed-effects logistic regression 
model. This model is an extension of a logistic regression model that takes into account the 
clustered structure of the data. In the present study, binary responses about the ownership of 
the different assets are nested within individuals. The probability of holding each of the assets 
was predicted using numeracy scores, cognitive ability scores and demographic variables. In 
addition, both the intercept and the slope coefficient for numeracy were allowed to vary 
across assets. In other words, we allow the average probability of ownership to be different 
for each asset and we also allow the effect of numeracy, on the estimated probability, to be 
different for each asset. Table B.1 and Table B.2 present the fixed-effects and random effects 
parameters, respectively.  
Numeracy scores, cognitive ability scores and age were mean-centered; other 
demographic variables were coded as follows: gender (Male = 0, Female = 1); Mother 
Tongue (Spanish = 0, Quechua = 1); Residence (Small Town = 0, Rural = 1); Married or 
cohabitating (No = 0, Yes = 1). Accordingly, probabilities were estimated for a typical sample 
responder: a 44-year-old female, living in a rural area, married, whose mother tongue is 
Quechua, and with average scores for fluid intelligence and crystalized intelligence. 
Probabilities reported in the main text were calculated as described below.  
The probability that a typical respondent with an average score for numeracy would 
hold asset i can be described as,�𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝐻𝐻 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖� =
exp(𝛽0+𝑢0𝑖 )
[1+ exp(𝛽0+𝑢0𝑖 )]
 , where 𝛽0 refers to the 
intercept (fixed-effect), 𝑁0𝑖 represents the random intercept for asset i and exp refers to the 
exponential function exp(𝛽0 + 𝑁0𝑖 ) =  ℮𝛽0+𝑢0𝑖  (Agresti, 2007). As an illustration consider 




= 73%.  
In a similar fashion, the probability that a typical respondent with high numeracy (1 
SD above the mean) would hold asset i can be described 
as,�𝑝𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑖𝐻𝐻 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑖� =
exp(𝛽0+𝑢0𝑖+ 𝛽1+𝑢1𝑖)
[1+ exp(𝛽0+𝑢0𝑖+ 𝛽1+𝑢1𝑖)]
 , where 𝛽0 is the intercept (fixed effect), 𝛽1 is 
the fixed effect for numeracy, 𝑁0𝑖 represents the random intercept for asset i, and 
𝑁1𝑖 represents the random slope for numeracy for asset i. In our example, the probability that 




88.6%.   
Finally, the probability that a typical respondent with low numeracy (1 SD below the 




where 𝛽0 represents the intercept (fixed effect), 𝛽1 is the fixed effect for numeracy, 
𝑁0𝑖 represents the random intercept for asset i, and 𝑁1𝑖 represents the random slope for 










Table B.1. Fixed-effects parameters of a mixed-effects logistic regression model used to 
predict the probability of holding an asset as function of numeracy and other predictors 
 β (SD) 
Fixed effects  
Numeracy (Mean centered) (𝛽1)  0.56*   (0.23) 
Fluid intelligence (Mean centered)  0.10*   (0.05) 
Crystalized intelligence (Mean centered)  0.03** (0.01) 
Age (Mean centered)  0.02     (0.01) 
Gender (Male = 0, Female = 1)  0.20     (0.21) 
Mother Tongue (Spanish = 0, Quechua = 1) -0.54*   (0.25) 
Residence (Small Town = 0, Rural = 1) -1.93** (0.26) 
Married or cohabitating (No = 0, Yes = 1)  -0.73** (0.26) 
Constant (𝛽0)  0.73     (0.57) 
N 240 
Note. Entries in table are logistic regression coefficients (SD); *p < .05, **p< .01. The 
dependent variable is dichotomous and indicates whether asset i is held (1 = yes). 
 
Table B.2. Random effects parameters of a mixed-effects logistic regression model used to 




Random slope for 
numeracy (𝑁1𝑖) 
Housing quality   
Floor made of cement relative to made of earth -0.60 0.26 
Toilet facilities relative to no toilet inside the house 1.77 0.04 
Piped water relative to other sources of water 3.23 -0.14 
Household durables   
Stove 0.26 0.50 
Fridge -1.10 0.29 
Computer -1.88 -0.02 
TV 1.32 -0.01 
Stereo -0.98 0.00 
Landline -2.13 -0.29 
Cellphone 1.51 -0.32 
Bike -1.06 -0.82 




























































This chapter is based on: Estrada-Mejia, C., De Vries, M., Zeelenberg, M., & Breugelmans, 




Numeracy is defined as the ability to process basic probabilistic and numerical concepts. We 
examined the relationship between numeracy and willingness to take risks for a representative 
sample of the Dutch population (N = 2,156), controlling for potential confounding factors 
(e.g., age, gender, education, and income). We also modeled possible decision strategies 
underlying choices and tested whether strategy selection was conditional upon participant’s 
numeracy, payoffs, or both. Specifically, we considered an expected value strategy (EV), as 
well as three heuristic strategies: least-likely, maximin, and maximax. Our findings revealed 
no significant differences on the willingness to take risk between individuals with low and 
high numeracy for low payoffs. However, for high payoffs, high numeracy individuals were 
significantly less willing to take risk than low numeracy individuals. In terms of decision 
strategies, as participants’ numeracy increased, the likelihood of using EV increased when 
payoffs were low, but decreased when payoffs were high. The opposite was observed for the 
maximin strategy. Independently of level of payoffs, as numeracy increased, the likelihood of 
choosing the least-likely or the maximax strategy decreased. Implications for the research on 








Numeracy, defined as an individual’s ability to understand and use numerical information, 
has been shown to play a significant role in how people make decisions (Dieckmann, Slovic, 
& Peters, 2009; Peters, Hart, & Fraenkel, 2011; Peters, Västfjäll, Slovic, Mertz, Mazzocco, & 
Dickert, 2006). Numerous studies revealed that low numerate people show consistent biases 
in the comprehension of risks and benefits (for reviews, see Dieckmann, 2009; Black, Nease, 
& Tosteson, 1995; Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997; Weinfurt et al., 2003), and 
that these biases often lead to disadvantageous decisions (Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & 
Pardo; Peters et al., 2006; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; Peters, Dieckmann, 
Dixon, Hibbard, & Mertz, 2007). This literature, however, has not achieved consensus on the 
relationship between numeracy and risk attitudes. The empirical evidence on whether people 
with low numeracy have different risk attitudes than people with high numeracy is mixed. It 
is important to understand this relationship, because if there is a systematic relationship 
between numeracy and risk attitudes, this could perhaps explain some of the biases and 
provide opportunities for intervention.    
The relationship between numeracy and risk attitudes has been shown to be complex. 
Some studies have found that high numerate individuals are more willing to take risk and 
make more choices consistent with expected-value maximization2 than low numerate 
individuals (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Dave, Eckel, Johnson, & Rojas, 2010; Frederick, 2005; 
Pachur & Galesic, 2013). However, more recent work has revealed no differences in 
willingness to take risk, or the number of expected-value consistent choices, between 
participants with high versus low numeracy (Benjamin, Brown, & Shapiro, 2013; Jasper, 
Bhattacharya, Levin, Jones, & Bossard, 2013). Therefore, the true nature of the relationship 
between numeracy and risk attitudes remains unclear. In this paper we continue the 
investigation of the relationship between numeracy and willingness to take risk, by using a 
                                                            
2 A choice consistent with expected-value maximization is for example to prefer a higher-expected-value 
gamble, such as 50% chance of €100 otherwise €0 over a guaranteed option of €40. 
research approach that may overcome some of the limitations of previous research. We 
believe four distinctive features of our current research allow us to better investigate a 
potential association between numeracy and willingness to take risk.   
First, the current study uses a large and heterogeneous sample (N = 2,156) of adults 
living in the Netherlands, which enhances the generalizability of our findings. In order to 
discover whether the association between numeracy and risk attitudes is a robust 
phenomenon, it is essential to observe individuals at all levels of numeracy (low, medium, 
and high). Previous studies (Benjamin et al., 2013; Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Frederick, 2005; 
Jasper et al., 2013), relying mainly on student populations, did not provide an opportunity to 
investigate the effect for a heterogeneous population. Since college students tend to be more 
numerate than the general population (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 
2001; Reyna & Brainerd, 2007), it is not clear whether previous findings are applicable to a 
wider population or rather an artifact of the subject pool.  
Second, we investigate the unique effect of numeracy on risk attitudes by controlling 
for potentially confounding socioeconomic factors that previous studies left unexamined. 
Abundant evidence has been accumulated showing that factors such as age, gender, 
education, and income influence risk attitudes (Bonsang & Dohmen, 2015; Dohmen, Falk, 
Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, & Wagner, 2011; Guiso & Paiella, 2004). We test whether 
numeracy has an effect above and beyond these factors. Numeracy is of most relevance for 
explaining differences in willingness to take risk to the degree that it can explain unique 
variance of the observed inter-individual heterogeneity. 
A third distinctive feature is that subjects in the current study made choices over 
monetary lotteries involving both low and high stakes. Risk taking behavior under high stakes 
is a relevant area of economic research because many of our “real-world” decisions, such as 
saving for retirement or taking a mortgage, entail substantial monetary costs and rewards. 
Moreover, researchers have raised the concern that measures of risk attitudes with low 
payoffs (like the ones encountered in the laboratory) may be somewhat unrealistic and 
therefore not useful in measuring attitudes toward real-world risks (Harrison, List, & Towe, 
2007; Holt & Laury, 2002). With the exception of one study in which the outcomes of 
hypothetical lotteries ranged up to $3,600 (Cokely & Kelly, 2009), previous studies have 
mainly looked at relatively low payoffs, stakes ranging up to €100. We study the impact of 
numeracy on risky choices with relatively high monetary outcomes (Payoff ranges between 
€3,000 and €9,750).  
Moreover, after examining differences in risk attitudes of more and less numerate 
people, we investigate a possible mechanism to explain how and why these differences might 
arise. Specifically, we study the cognitive processes underlying choices between risky 
options. Within the decision making literature, researchers have identified a multitude of 
decision strategies that describe how probabilities and outcomes could be evaluated. Some of 
them, such as the expected value strategy (Huygens, 1657; Laplace, 1814), use information 
extensively by weighting and adding probabilities and outcomes. Other models, such as the 
maximin (Wald, 1945), use only a subset of information by focusing only on the outcomes. In 
essence, different strategies reflect different ways to cope with the uncertainties inherent in 
risky choices. The underlying hypothesis is that low and high numerate people might have 
different risk attitudes, because they use different decision strategies to cope with uncertainty. 
Let us next outline the decision strategies that we considered.  
Numeracy and decision strategy  
We modeled participants’ choices using four different decision strategies that can be 
viewed as plausible competitors in risky decision making. 3 Specifically, we considered a 
compensatory model based on calculations of the expectation of the alternatives (expected 
value strategy: EV), two non-compensatory models that focus on the outcomes and disregard 
probability information, maximin (Wald, 1945) and maximax (Coombs, Dawes, & Tversky, 
1970), and one non-compensatory strategy that focus on the probabilities, least-likely 
heuristic (Thorngate, 1980). The decision rules underlying each of these decision strategies 
are summarized in Table 1. We test whether numeracy and the stakes of the lotteries influence 
the strategy selection. 
Table 1. Description of decision strategies 
Name Decision Rule 
Expected value strategy People aggregate the outcomes of each option, weighted by their 
respective probabilities, and choose the option with the most 
attractive expected value 
Maximin strategy People only consider the worst outcomes of each option and 
choose the option with the most attractive worst outcome 
Maximax strategy People only consider the best outcomes of each option and choose 
the option with the most attractive best outcome 
Least-likely strategy People identify each option’s worst outcomes and choose the 
option with the lowest probability of yielding the worst outcome 
 
 To our knowledge, only Pachur and Galesic (2013) have studied the correlation 
between numeracy and strategy selection. They provide some support for the hypothesis that 
numeracy influences the selection of the strategy. However, their studies are limited to risky 
decisions with low payoffs in the loss domain. We complemented their findings by studying 
the impact of numeracy on strategy selection in the gain domain and with decisions involving 
both high and low payoffs. Before we present the study let us discuss some mechanisms that 
may account for the link between numeracy and risk attitudes. 
                                                            
3 A comprehensive compilation of heuristics can be found in Gigerenzer, Hertwig, and Pachur (2011). 
Numeracy and risk attitudes  
Numeracy encompasses the ability to understand and use numeric concepts, to 
perform basic mathematical operations, compare magnitudes, and comprehend ratio concepts 
such as fractions, proportions, percentages and probabilities (Lipkus et al., 2001; Schwartz et 
al., 1997). There are several mechanisms that may account for the link between numeracy and 
risk attitudes. For one, numeracy facilitates mathematical computations (e.g., doing addition, 
subtraction, multiplication, and statistical inferences; Ancker & Kaufman, 2007) and greater 
depth of numerical processing (e.g., make comparisons between numbers, integrate two or 
more pieces of information; Lipkus & Peters, 2009). Therefore, one might expect that 
numerate people will be more likely to integrate probabilities and outcome information and 
thus more likely to choose the option with the higher expected value. Put differently, people 
high in numeracy are expected to use the expected value strategy more often than those low in 
numeracy. 
 Another pathway through which numeracy might influence risk attitudes is by 
improving the interpretation and subjective meaning of the outcomes and probabilities. 
People give meaning to objective numbers by transforming them into subjective quantity 
(Schley & Peters, 2014; Furlong & Opfer, 2009). Less numerate people appear to have less 
precise mapping of objective quantities into subjective mental quantities (Schley & Peters, 
2014). This could explain, for example, why their subjective risk estimates significantly differ 
from the objective value (Black et al., 1995; Weinfurt et al., 2003). Thus, if numeracy 
systematically increases or decreases an individual’s risk perception, then risk may 
systematically appear as more or less attractive to that person.    
As an alternative mechanism, numeracy may influence the relative importance of 
information. Low numeracy has been shown to increase the reliance on non-numerical 
sources of information, such as narrative information and mood states (Lipkus & Peters, 
2009; Dieckmann et al., 2009). Therefore, one might expect that emotional reactions such as 
the thrill of winning, or the thrill of gambling, or the pain of losing, could systematically 
influence the risk attitudes of the low numerate. As a result of these emotional influences, low 
numerate people could appear as systematically more risk seeking or more risk averse.  
The findings presented above suggest that (at least intuitively) numeracy and risk 
attitudes should be associated. However, the empirical evidence is mixed and the pattern of 
association is unclear. To further our understanding of the relationship between numeracy and 
risk taking behavior in the financial domain, we examined the relationship between numeracy 
and willingness to take risks using data from a large Dutch population sample. We tested 
whether numeracy was correlated with risk attitudes, whether risk attitudes of people with 
high versus low numeracy were conditional to the payoff, and also whether those with higher 
versus lower numeracy differed on the decision strategy underling their choices.  
Method 
Participants and background data 
In total, 2,156 subjects participated in this study. All participants were members of the 
LISS panel,4 an Internet panel managed by CentERdata, an organization affiliated with 
Tilburg University. Panel members complete one questionnaire over the Internet each month 
and are reimbursed for completing the questionnaires four times a year. All study data are 
publicly available at www.lissdata.nl. The LISS panel is a representative sample of the Dutch 
population in terms of observable background characteristics. Here, we used a random 
subsample, stratified to reflect the population.  
                                                            
4 for more information about this panel see: http://www.centerdata.nl/en/databank/liss-panel-data-0 
Comprehensive background data are available for the panel participants, including 
gender, age, income, education, data on numeracy, and experimental data on risk attitudes. 
Through the unique identification numbers of the panel members, we connected the surveys 
and experimental measures. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2.      










high condition p value 
Numeracy (0-11) 8.4 (2.5) 8.4 (2.6) 8.5 (2.5) 8.3 (2.5) .292 
Age 50.9 (15.4) 51.5 (15.5) 50.7 (15.3) 50.5 (15.4) .421 
Female 48.4% 48.4% 50.1% 46.5% .435 
High Education 40.7% 39.7% 42.9% 39.8% .392 
Log income 3.1 (.3) 3.1 (.3) 3.1 (.3) 3.1 (.3) .802 
# of obs 2156 847 679 630  
Note. Entries are means. Standard errors in parentheses. The p-value reported in the last 
column refers to the t tests comparing mean scores between the three payoff conditions  
 
Design and procedure  
Demographic information and numeracy were measured in surveys administered 
weeks and months prior to the experiment to elicit risk attitudes. Risk attitudes were elicited 
in an incentivized experiment designed by Noussair, Trautmann, and Van de Kuilen (2013). 
The task was administered on a computer. Participants made 10 binary choices between 
lotteries grouped in two parts. Part one consisted of five choices between a guaranteed option 
and a risky lottery that paid €65 or €5 with equal probability. The guaranteed option varied 
from €20 to €40 in steps of €5. Part two consisted of five binary choices between two risky 
lotteries. The choices in part one were used to assess a participant’s willingness to take risk; 
the choices in part one and two were combined to profile the decision strategies. Part one 
always came first. A list of all choices is given in Appendix A.  
Subjects were presented with one choice at a time. The five choices measuring 
willingness to take risk were ordered, such that the certain payoff increased (or decreased in 
counterbalanced conditions) monotonically. No indifference option was provided, so subjects 
always had to choose one of the lotteries. The presentation of the lotteries with respect to the 
position on the left or the right sides of the screen was counterbalanced.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. Each subject 
participated in only one experimental condition. In the Real-low condition (N = 847) each 
individual had a 1 in 10 chance of being randomly selected to receive a real monetary 
payment. The payoffs in the Hypothetical-low condition (N = 679) were identical to the Real-
low condition, except for the fact that no choices counted towards participant earnings. The 
Hypothetical-high condition (N = 630) was identical to the Hypothetical-low condition, 
except for the fact that payoffs were scaled up by a factor of 150. In all conditions, zero or 
negative earnings were impossible.  
Measures 
Demographics. Gender, age, and education were obtained for all participants. 
Participants who reported finishing higher vocational education or university received a score 
of 1 and 0 otherwise. 
Income. LISS Panel members indicated their personal net monthly income in Euros 
for 2009. Estimated net annual income was obtained by multiplying the raw score by 12. Log-
transformed scores were used for analyses. 
Numeracy. Numeracy was measured using an 11-item scale (Lipkus et al., 2001) 
which tests for basic arithmetic and statistical skills. An example question is: “Imagine that 
we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls how many times do you think 
the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)?” (Correct answer: 500 out of 1,000). The total 
resulting numeracy score reflected the sum of correct answers, with higher scores indicating 
higher levels of numeracy. Possible scores range from 0-11, Cronbach's alpha = .78.   
Willingness to take risk. The measure of willingness to take risk was operationalized 
as the proportion of risky choices: The number of times the participant chooses the risky 
lottery, instead of the guaranteed option, divided by 5. Higher scores indicate more 
willingness to take risk. 
High-expected-value choices. The measure of high-expected-value choices 
corresponds to the proportion of choices of the option with higher expected value. For 
instance, choosing the risky option B when asked to choose between a guaranteed Option A 
(€20) and a risky Option B (50% chance of €45, otherwise €5: Expected value: €25) was 
coded as a high-expected-value choice. The measure was operationalized as the number of 
times the participant chose the option with the higher expected value divided by 4. We 
divided by 4 instead of 5 because one binary lottery choice was not included in this measure; 
for this option the expected value of the lottery was equal to the guaranteed option.  Higher 
scores indicate more choices consistent with expected value. 
Results 
Descriptive analyses 
Sample statistics are shown in Table 2. About 48.4% of the sample are female, 
average age is 50.9 years (Range = 19-88), and 40.7% of respondents have higher education. 
The measure for numeracy has a mean value of 8.4 (SD = 2.5, Range = 0-11). Different t tests 
comparing mean scores on numeracy and control variables between the three payoff 
conditions revealed no significant differences (All p-values > .292). 
Analysis of payoff conditions 
 The effect of the payoffs on participants’ choices and strategy selection was analyzed 
using two orthogonal contrasts. The Low-high contrast compared the Hypothetical-high 
payoff condition with the two low payoff conditions (Real-low and Hypothetical-low). 
Participants in the Hypothetical-high condition received a value of -2 and all participants of 
the other two low payoff conditions received a value of 1. This contrast comparison 
investigates whether participants facing low stakes lotteries make different choices, or use 
different decision strategies, than participants facing high stakes lotteries. A second contrast 
called Real-hypothetical contrast compares the hypothetical low payoff condition with the 
real low payoff condition. This contrast assigns the value of 1 to participants in the real low 
payoff condition, -1 to participants in the hypothetical low payoff condition and 0 to 
participants in the high payoff condition. This comparison tests whether choices in the 
hypothetical low payoff condition differ from those in the real payment condition.  
The first part of the analyses focuses on studying whether numeracy is correlated with 
willingness to take risk (operationalized as the proportion of risky choices) and with expected 
value consistent choices (operationalized as the proportion of choices of the option with 
higher expected value). Next, we tested whether more and less numerate participants differ on 
decision strategies.   
Willingness to take risk  
Table 3 presents the results of a regression analysis with willingness to take risk as 
dependent variable and numeracy, the two contrast variables (i.e., Low-High Contrast and 
Real-Hypothetical Contrast), their interaction with numeracy, and controls5 as independent 
variables (Model 1). There was a significant main effect of numeracy (b = -0.008, SD = 0.003, 
t = -2.576, p = .010) such that numeracy was negatively correlated with willingness to take 
risk. There was also a significant main effect of the dummy contrasting the low payoff with 
the high payoff groups (Low-High Contrast) (b = -0.036, SD = 0.005, t = -7.033, p < .001). 
Willingness to take risk was significantly higher in the low payoff conditions (M = 35.3%, 
                                                            
5 Control variables were included as covariates. The interactions between numeracy and the covariates were not 
statistically significant, ps > .05.  
SD= 33.6) than in the high payoff condition (M = 24.3%, SD = 32.2). However, these main 
effects were qualified by a significant interaction between numeracy and the Low-high 
contrast (b = -0.009, SD = 0.002, t = -4.238, p < .001).  
To interpret the interaction we performed two additional analyses. First, simple slope 
analyses demonstrated that high numerate participants (1 SD above the mean) were less 
willing to take risk when the payoff was high, compared to when the payoff was low (b Low-
High Contrast = -0.059, SD = 0.007, t = -8.054, p < .001). Willingness to take risk of low 
numerate participants (1 SD below the mean), did not differ between the high payoff vs. the 
low payoff conditions (bLow-High Contrast = -0.014, SD = 0.008, t = -1.824, p = .068). Regression 











Table 3. The relationship between willingness to take risk and numeracy controlling for 
differences in demographic variables   
 Model 1: Base line 
Model 2: High 
numeracy 

























































































































R2  .058 .058 .058 .053 .033 
# of obs 2156 2156 2156 630 1526 
Note. Entries are regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p< .01. Omitted 
categories: male and low education (primary and lower secondary education). Variables for which 
interactions are calculated are centered. Real-hypothetical Contrast = Contrast variable contrasting the 
low-real-payoff group with the low-hypothetical-payoff group; Low-High Contrast = Contrast variable 
contrasting the low-payoff groups with the high-payoff group; Dummy order= Dummy variable 
comparing the order of the presentation of the tasks; Dummy position = Dummy variable comparing 
the position of the presentation. 
 
Next, separate regressions (Table 3, Models 4 and 5) per payoff condition revealed 
that the relationship between willingness to take risk and numeracy was not statistically 
significant when the payoff was low (bnumeracy = 0.001, SD = 0.004, t = 0.006, p = .995), but it 
was significant when the payoff was high (bnumeracy = -0.023, SD = 0.006, t = -4.079, p < 
.001). When the stakes were high, willingness to take risk decreased as numeracy increased. 
These results are summarized in Figure 1a, which displays the proportion of risky choices 
separately for payoff condition and numeracy level.    
Figure 1. Proportion of risky choices and proportion of high expected value choices 
presented separately for payoff condition and numeracy level (median split)  
 
The results thus suggest that willingness to take risk does not vary systematically with 
numeracy. When the payoffs were low, there were no significant differences on the 
willingness to take risk between individuals with low and high numeracy. When the payoffs 
were high, individuals with higher numeracy were significantly less willing to take risk than 
participants with low numeracy. Furthermore, high numerate participants made fewer risky 
choices when the stakes were high as compared to when they were low (High payoff: 19.5% 
vs. Low payoff: 36.5%). The risky choices of low numerate participants appeared to be 
invariant to changes in payoffs (High payoff: 30.9% vs. Low payoff: 36.6%). For presentation 
purposes we created Table 4, Columns 1 and 2, which shows the proportion of risky choices, 
classifying participants into low versus high numeracy by means of median split (Median = 
8.4) and payoff condition. 
Table 4. Mean proportion of risky choices and expected value choices by numeracy level and 
payoff condition 
 Proportion risky choices  Proportion expected value choices 
Numeracy Low payoff High payoff  Low payoff High payoff 
Low (Below mean) 36.6% 30.9%  49.8% 45.3% 
High (Above mean) 36.5% 19.5%  58.2% 43.1% 
 
High-expected-value choices 
Table 5 presents the results of a regression analysis with the proportion of high-
expected-value choices as dependent variable and numeracy, the two contrast variables, their 
interaction with numeracy, and controls6 as independent variables (Model 6). There was a 
significant main effect of the Low-High Contrast variable (comparing the low payoff with the 
high payoff groups) (b = -0.035, SD = 0.004, t = -7.906, p < .001) and a significant 
interaction between numeracy and the Low-High Contrast (b = -0.006, SD = 0.002, t = -
3.176, p = .002). Separate regression analyses per payoff condition (Table 5, Models 9 and 
10) showed that the proportion of high-expected-value choices and numeracy was not 
statistically significant for high payoffs (bnumeracy = -0.004, SD = 0.005, t = -0.751, p = .453) 
but it was significant for low payoffs (bnumeracy = 0.009, SD = 0.003, t = 2.755, p = .006). In 
the low payoff condition, the proportion of choices with higher expected value increased as 
numeracy increased but there was no association when the payoff was high. Figure 1b shows 
the proportion of high-expected-value choices separately for payoff condition and numeracy 
level.   
Simple slope analyses demonstrated that participants made fewer high-expected-value 
                                                            
6 The interactions between numeracy and the covariates were not statistically significant ps > .05.  
choices when the payoffs were high rather than low. This effect was stronger for high 
numerate participants (1 SD above the mean; bLow-High Contrast = -0.050, SD = 0.006, t = -7.896, 
p < .001) than for low numerate participants (1 SD above the mean; bLow-High Contrast = -0.021, 
SD = 0.007, t = -3.175, p = .002). Regression coefficients are shown in Table 5, Models 7 and 
8 respectively.  
Table 5. The relationship between expected value consistent choices and numeracy 
controlling for differences in demographic variables   
 Model 6: 
Base Line 
Model 7: High 
Numeracy 

























































































































R2  .070 .070 .070 .014 .051 
# of obs 2156 2156 2156 630 1526 
Note. Entries are regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p< .01. Omitted 
categories: male and low education (primary and lower secondary education). Variables for which 
interactions are calculated are centered. Real-hypothetical Contrast = Contrast variable contrasting the 
low-real-payoff group with the low-hypothetical-payoff group; Low-High Contrast = Contrast variable 
contrasting the low-payoff groups with the high-payoff group; Dummy order= Dummy variable 
comparing the order of the presentation of the tasks; Dummy position = Dummy variable comparing 
the position of the presentation. 
In sum, participants made fewer high-expected-value choices when the payoff was 
high compared to when it was low. However, this change in preferences was stronger for high 
numerate participants (High payoff: 43.1% vs. Low payoff: 58.2%) than for low numerate 
participants (High payoff: 45.3% vs. Low payoff: 49.8%) (Percentages reported in Table 4, 
Columns 3 and 4). In addition, when the payoff was high, there were no significant 
differences in the proportion of high-expected-value choices between low and high numerate 
participants. However, when the payoff was low, high numerate participants made more 
choices with higher expected value than their low numerate counterparts.     
Strategy Selection 
Our second goal was to examine whether more and less numerate participants rely on 
different strategies when choosing between high stakes and low stakes lotteries. To 
investigate this question, we first modeled each participant’s choices with the EV, the least-
likely, the maximin and the maximax strategy, and classified each participant to the strategy 
with the best fit. A detailed explanation of the classification procedure can be found in 
Appendix A. First, to understand the nature of the relationship we created Table 6, which 
shows the proportion of participants classified in each strategy broken down by numeracy and 
payoff condition. Overall, most participants were classified as using a maximin strategy 
(55.5%) or an EV strategy (19.8%). Participants with low numeracy appear to use the same 
strategy independent of the payoff, as shown by the fairly equal proportion of participants 
using each strategy in the low vs. high payoff condition. In contract, participants with high 
numeracy appear to use different strategies depending on the payoffs. Specifically, they seem 
to change from an EV to a maximin strategy when payoffs were increased. 
 
 
Table 6. Distribution of strategies by numeracy level and payoff condition 
 
Low numeracy 
(Below mean)  
High numeracy 
(Above mean) Total 
sample  Low payoff High payoff  Low payoff High payoff 
EV 15.7 14.8  25.6 15.6 19.8 
Maximin 52.9 57.0  52.4 66.9 55.5 
Least-Likely 11.1 12.5  5.7 3.1 7.6 
Maximax 20.3 15.6  16.3 14.5 17.0 
Total 100 100  100 100 100 
Note. Entries are percentages. 
Next, we conducted a multinomial logistic regression to assess whether a participant’s 
strategy depends on the respondent’s numeracy, the payoff condition, or both. A series of 
models were fitted and the most parsimonious model was retained, final estimates are 
presented in Table 7. 
First, we examined the result graphically. The graphs in Figure 2 show the relationship 
between numeracy and the predicted probability for each decision strategy, by payoff 
condition. The relationship between numeracy and the probability of selecting an EV strategy 
(see Figure 2a) was generally positive when payoffs were low, indicating that higher 
numeracy was related to a higher probability of selecting an EV strategy, but it was almost 
constant when payoffs were high. On the other hand, the relationship between numeracy and 
the probability of selecting a maximin strategy (see Figure 2b) was strong and positive for 
high payoffs, and generally weak and positive for low payoffs. Furthermore, the relationship 
between numeracy and the probability of selecting the least-likely strategy (see Figure 2c) or 
the maximax strategy (see Figure 2d) was negative for both payoffs conditions, indicating 
that, independent of the payoff, higher numeracy was related to a lower probability of 
selecting either a least-likely or a maximax strategy. 
We now turn to evaluate the selection of the strategies in comparative terms. We used 
the EV strategy as the reference category in the multinomial logistic regression. Therefore, 
the estimated parameters indicate whether numeracy, or the payoff condition, affects the 
likelihood of selecting the maximin, least-likely, or maximax strategy rather than the EV 
strategy.  
Table 7, Column 1 presents the model comparing the EV strategy with the maximin 
strategy; overall there was a significant interaction between numeracy and the payoff 
conditions (b = -0.133, Wald χ2 (1) = 7.124, p = .008). Therefore, the effect of numeracy on 
the likelihood of selecting a maximin strategy over an EV strategy depends on whether the 
payoff is low or high. To explore this further, we obtained the logit model for each payoff 
condition. The predicted log odds for participants in the low payoff condition was, 
ln � 𝑃(𝐸𝐸)
𝑃(𝑀𝑎𝑀𝑖𝑀𝑖𝐻)
� =  1.024 − 0.075 (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑁𝑊𝑁𝑁). Similarly, the predicted log odds for 
participants in the high payoff condition was, ln � 𝑃(𝐸𝐸)
𝑃(𝑀𝑎𝑀𝑖𝑀𝑖𝐻)
� =  1.477 +
0.058 (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑁𝑊𝑁𝑁). The estimated slopes in the previous equations (Slope low payoff 
condition = -0.075; Slope high payoff condition = 0.058) indicate that as participants’ 
numeracy increased the odds of selecting a maximin strategy, rather than an EV strategy, 
increased when payoffs were high but decreased when payoffs were low.    
The model comparing the least-likely strategy with the EV strategy is reported in 
Table 7, column 2. The interaction between numeracy and the payoff conditions was not 
statistically significant (b = -0.037, Wald χ2 (1) = 0.258, p = .611). However, there was a 
significant main effect of numeracy (b = -0.129, Wald χ2 (1) = 4.266, p = .039). The odds 
ratio showed that as numeracy increased the likelihood of selecting a least-likely strategy 
decreased (Odds ratio = 0.879). Finally, the model contrasting the maximax strategy with the 
EV strategy is reported in Table 7, column 3. Neither the interaction between numeracy and 
the payoff conditions (b = -0.116, Wald χ2 (1) = 3.716, p = .054), nor the main effect of 
numeracy were statistically significant (b = -0.050, Wald χ2 (1) = 0.912, p =.340).  
Table 7. Results of a multinomial logistic regression with Expected Value strategy as the 
reference category 
 Maximin vs. EV  Least-Likely vs. EV Maximax vs. EV 












































Note: Entries are regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < .05, **p< .01. 
Omitted categories: male and low education (primary and lower secondary education). 
 
Taken together, these comparative analyses show that the likelihood of using 
maximin, rather than EV, depends on both numeracy and payoffs. As participants’ numeracy 
increased, the likelihood of using a maximin strategy, rather than EV, increased when payoffs 
were high, but decreased when payoffs were low. On the contrary, independently of the 
payoffs, as numeracy increased, the likelihood of choosing the least-likely, rather than the 
EV, decreased. We did not find an association between numeracy and the payoff on the 






Figure 2. Graphs depicting the relationship between numeracy and predicted probability, by 





The evidence for the effect of numeracy on the willingness to take risk is mixed. Some 
studies have found that high numerate individuals are more willing to take risk and make 
more choices consistent with expected-value maximization than low numerate individuals 
(Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Frederick, 2005; Pachur & Galesic, 2013; Dave et al., 2010) while 
others find no such effects (Benjamin et al., 2013; Jasper et al., 2013). Although informative, 
previous studies were limited in terms of the size and representativeness of the sample, and 
could not control for potentially confounding factors. Here, we examined the relationship 
between numeracy and willingness to take risk for a large Dutch population sample, 
controlling for potential correlated factors (e.g., age, gender, education, and income). Our 
findings revealed that willingness to take risk depends on both people’s numeracy and the 
payoff. When the payoff was low, there were no significant differences in the willingness to 
take risk between individuals with low and high numeracy. On the contrary, when the payoff 
was high, individuals with higher numeracy were significantly less willing to take risk than 
participants with low numeracy. Furthermore, we found that participants with high numeracy 
made fewer risky choices when the stakes were high as compared to when they were low. In 
contrast, the number of risky choices of low numerate participants appeared to be invariant to 
changes in payoffs.   
In terms of the proportion of choices consistent with expected-value maximization, we 
found that numeracy and the stakes of the lotteries also interact. When the payoff was low, 
high numerate participants made more choices consistent with expected value than their low 
numerate counterparts. However, when the payoff was high there were no differences in the 
proportion of expected value choices between low and high numerate participants. In general, 
all participants made fewer choices consistent with expected value when the payoff was high 
compared to when it was low. 
Regarding the decision strategies underlying participants’ choices, our findings 
revealed that the likelihood of using an EV or a maximin strategy depends on both numeracy 
and payoffs. Specifically, as participants’ numeracy increased the likelihood of using EV 
increased when payoffs were low but decreased when payoffs were high. The opposite was 
observed for the maximin strategy: higher numeracy was related to a lower probability of 
selecting this strategy when payoffs were low and to a higher probability when payoffs were 
high. Finally, independently of the payoffs, as numeracy increased the likelihood of choosing 
the least-likely or the maximax strategy decreased.   
We think that the main contribution of our research is that it reveals that the 
willingness to take risk of high numerate people is conditional upon the stakes at play. 
Conversely, the risk attitude of low numerate people appears to be invariant across the stakes. 
These differences might be explained by low numerate and high numerate people using 
different decision strategies. Participants with low numeracy appear to use the same decision 
strategy independent of the payoff. In contrast, for low payoffs, high numerate people were 
likely to use an expected value strategy; however, when the stakes increased, they changed to 
a risk conservative strategy, as is the maximin. Remember that according to the maximin 
strategy the decision maker should choose the alternative that provides the best outcome 
under the worst circumstances. This way, decision makers can maximize their outcome even 
if the circumstances turn out to be disadvantageous. 
Our findings raise the query of why high numerate participants were less willing to 
take risk when the payoff was high compared to when it was low. One possible explanation is 
that they might have derived evaluative meaning from the numeric information by comparing 
the payoffs to more familiar monetary quantities. For instance, they could have compared the 
lottery outcomes to the cost of a meal in the low payoff condition and to the average monthly 
salary in the high payoff condition. Furthermore, this number-comparison process could have 
highlighted the potential detrimental financial consequences of taking a risky bet in the high 
payoff condition, and the less significant consequences of taking risk when the stakes were 
low. In that case, this number-comparison could have resulted in a change of the 
attractiveness of the gamble in the high payoff condition.   
Note that in the high payoff condition, the difference between the worst possible 
outcome of the lottery and the guaranteed option was €3,750 on average. Therefore, choosing 
the lottery rather than the guaranteed option, and facing the lottery’s worst outcome, implies a 
loss of €3,750, which is almost a €1,000 higher than the average monthly salary in this 
population (Mean gross monthly income = €2,460). Without a reference point or context, 
numbers are particularly difficult to evaluate (Hsee, 1996; Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Hsee 
& Zhang, 2010). On the contrary, bringing context to the numbers, for example by comparing 
an unfamiliar quantity to a familiar quantity, facilitates its understanding (Peters, Dieckmann, 
Västfjäll, Mertz, Slovic, & Hibbard, 2009). For instance, knowing that you risk losing €3,750 
is probably less informative than knowing that losing €3,750 is like losing your monthly 
salary.  
Our findings also add to the growing literature documenting that the less numerate are 
relatively insensitive to differences between numeric magnitudes (Jasper et al., 2013; Kleber, 
Dickert, Peters, & Florack, 2013). Here, we show that the risky choices of the low numerate 
individuals were virtually invariant to differences in the stakes of the lottery.  
A further contribution of the present research is the comparison of multiple decision 
strategies. Previous investigations could only discriminate whether participants were or were 
not making decisions in accordance with an EV strategy. In this paper we tested not only 
whether participants were using a compensatory EV strategy but also whether or not they 
decided in accordance with three other heuristic strategies. We suggest that the systematic 
comparison of different decision models could provide important insight on the cognitive 
processes underlying choices. In particular, the comparison of these four models can help 
researchers to best describe how people with low and high numeracy use information on 
probabilities and outcomes to make decisions facing risk. 
Although our findings revealed that participants deviate more from expected-value-
consistent choices when the payoff was high compared to when it was low, and that this effect 
was stronger for high numerate participants than for low numerate participants, a word of 
caution is needed here. Our measure was based on four choices. In three of those choices the 
risky option (the lottery) had a higher expected value than the guaranteed option. Therefore, 
participants choosing the guaranteed option were coded as deviating from an expected-value-
consistent choice. It is possible, however, that this measure captures participants’ risk 
aversion more than systematic deviations from normative choices. In order to better study 
whether individuals systematically deviate from normative choices consistent with expected-
value maximization, it would be necessary to include options in the choice set in which the 
expected value of the guaranteed option is higher than the expected value for the risky option. 
If an individual systematically deviates from normative choices, he or she should choose the 
risky option also in this last case.  
Conclusion and final remarks 
In sum, although the overall emerging picture in the literature is that there is a relationship 
between numeracy and risk attitudes, the empirical evidence is mixed. In this paper we 
addressed this question using a large sample and a meticulous experiment for risk elicitation, 
and we found that the relationship between numeracy and risk attitudes is better represented 
as a complex mosaic rather than a simple pattern. When payoffs were low we did not find a 
difference between participants with low and high numeracy on their willingness to take risk. 
On the contrary, when payoffs were high participants with high numeracy were more risk 
averse, and not less, as has been suggested before. We propose that our findings are consistent 
with high numerate individuals being more likely to bring context to the numbers and to 
realize the possible detrimental financial consequences of their choices. However, we are 
aware that although this is a possible explanation for our findings, this explanation is post hoc 





















Classification of participants into the decision strategies 
 In order to investigate the cognitive process underlying participants’ choices, we 
modeled each participant’s responses with the expected value (EV) strategy, the maximin 
strategy, the maximax strategy and the least-likely strategy, and classified each participant to 
the strategy with the best fit. Specifically, participants made 10 binary choices between 
lotteries and our goal was to determine the strategy that most likely generated those choices. 
We further refer to the 10 binary choices as problems - from problem 1 to problem 10. Table 
A.1 displays these problems. We followed the classification procedure proposed by Bröder 
and Schiffer (2003) and used a similar notation.  
The first step was to determine, for each problem, the answer-choice consistent with 
following each of the 4 strategies. For example, in problem 1, first row in Table A.1, 
participants were asked to choose between a guaranteed Option A (€20) over a risky Option B 
(50% chance of €65, otherwise €5), a participant following the EV strategy prefers option B, 
while a participant following the minimax strategy prefers option A. Notice that based on the 
answers to this problem we can differentiate between a participant following the EV strategy 
and a participant following the minimax. However, we cannot discriminate between someone 
following the EV from someone following the maximax or the least-likely strategy, because 
individuals following any of these three strategies would prefer option B.  
Problems 2 and 3 are similar too problem 1, they make the same predictions about the 
response-choices consistent with each of the strategies: someone following EV chooses B, 
following the minimax chooses A, the maximax chooses B and the least-likely strategy 
chooses B. On the contrary, problems 6, 7, and 9 make different predictions than problem 1: a 
participant following EV chooses A or B, the minimax chooses A, the maximax chooses A 
and following the least likely strategy chooses B. Note that these three problems cannot make 
a prediction about the response-choice that is consistent with following an EV strategy, 
because both options, A and B, have the same expected value. In that sense, both options are 
equally consistent (or inconsistent) with the strategy. All instances in which it was not 
possible to determine whether Option A or Option B was consistent with a particular strategy 
are shown in Table A.1 as ‘A-B’.  
As explained above, each of the 10 problems can be characterized based on the 4 
predictions that they make about the response-choice consistent with each strategy. Five 
different response patterns were identified and hence, we classified the 10 problems into 5 
problem-types. Table A.1 displays the correspondence between problems and problem-type. 
Subsequently, the likelihood functions were calculated as described below.  
Let k denote the decision strategy such that k ∊ {EV, Minimax, Maximax, Least-
likely, Random} with Random being the strategy of guessing. Let j be the problem-type as 
shown in Table A.1 with j ∊ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and let nj be the number of each problem-type j in 
the task. Further, for each participant i let nijk be the number of observed choices of problem-
type j that are compatible with strategy k. Then, the likelihood of the observed frequencies 
under the assumption of strategy k can be calculated as follows: 





 ×  (1 − 𝜀𝑖𝑖)𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖 ×  𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝐻𝑖−𝐻𝑖𝑖𝑖) 
Where 𝜀𝑖𝑖 represents participants i’s error for strategy k. For each strategy 𝜀𝑖𝑖 was 
estimated as the proportion of choices that deviated from strategy k’s predictions. Remember 
that we mentioned that some problems cannot make a prediction for a certain strategy (shown 
as ‘A-B’ in Table A.1). Therefore, 𝜀𝑖𝑖 for the EV strategy was calculated as the number of 
choices inconsistent with an EV strategy divided by 4. Likewise, the 𝜀𝑖𝑖 for the least-likely 
strategy was calculated as the number of choices inconsistent with a least-likely strategy 
divided by 8. Additionally, 𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 0.5 for k = Random and for problems that cannot make a 
prediction (‘A-B’ in Table A.1). Finally, the likelihood value was undefined for 𝜀𝑖𝑖= 0, 
however, this also means that a participant’s choices perfectly match the predictions of 
strategy k. Therefore, in these cases, participants were classified as following that strategy. 
Finally, after computing the likelihood functions for each strategy for each participant, 
we classified each participant into the strategy with the highest likelihood. We used the 
following criteria: if the likelihood of the best fitting strategy equaled or was lower than the 
value of the likelihood function under random choice, then the participant was classified as 
following a random strategy. However, none of the participants was finally classified as 















Table A.1. Lottery problems, response-choice predictions and problem-type classification 
 
Choices Response-choice predictions 
Problem-type 
 
Option A Option B EV Minimax Least-likely Maximax 
1 Guaranteed €20 €65(.50)_ €5(.50) B A B B 1 
2 Guaranteed €25 €65(.50)_ €5(.50) B A B B 1 
3 Guaranteed €30 €65(.50)_ €5(.50) B A B B 1 
4 Guaranteed €35 €65(.50)_ €5(.50) A-B A B B 2 
5 Guaranteed €40 €65(.50)_ €5(.50) A A B B 3 
6 €110(.25)_ €70(.25)_ €60(.50) €90(.50)_ €80(.25)_ €40(.50) A-B A B A 4 
7 €100(.25)_ €80(.25)_ €60(.50) €90(.50)_ €70(.25)_ €50(.50) A-B A B A 4 
8 €130(.25)_ €50(.25)_ €60(.50) €90(.50)_ €100(.25)_ €20(.50) A-B A A-B A 5 
9 €165(.25)_ €105(.25)_ €90(.50) €135(.50)_ €120(.25)_ €60(.50) A-B A B A 4 
10 €85(.25)_ €45(.25)_ €35(.50) €65(.50)_ €55(.25)_ €15(.50) A-B A A-B A 5 
Note. A guaranteed option indicates the participant receives that quantity for sure. Lottery problems are described by the payoff followed by the 
corresponding probability in parenthesis. For instance, “€65(.50)_€5(.50)” can be read as 50% chance of €65 and a 50% chance of €5. Response-
choice predictions indicate, for each problem, the Option (A or B) consistent with that strategy. In the high payoff condition payoffs displayed in 






























































In this thesis I studied the psychology of numeracy and more specifically aimed to better 
understand the relationship between an individual’s numeracy and his or her wealth. 
Numeracy refers to a person’s ability to use mathematical knowledge in reflective and 
insight-based ways (see Chapter 1 for a more elaborate discussion of what numeracy is). 
Wealth refers to a person’s financial assets (e.g., saving accounts), nonfinancial assets (e.g., 
art and precious metals) and liabilities (e.g., mortgages) accrued over the lifetime. Wealth is 
critical for people’s well-being because it allows individuals to be economically secure, stable 
and independent, and to create opportunities for the next generation (Shapiro, Meschede, & 
Osoro, 2013). In this thesis I aimed to better understand whether numeracy is a primary force 
behind wealth accumulation. In this final chapter, I first summarize the main empirical 
findings, and then I elaborate on what we have learned from these findings with regards to the 
psychology of numeracy and its relationship with wealth. Finally, this chapter concludes with 
recommendations for future research. 
Overview of the empirical chapters and main findings 
The question of whether numeracy has a unique effect on wealth is central throughout 
Chapter 2. In particular, in this chapter I aimed at answering two questions: 1). Is the effect of 
numeracy on wealth sensitive to the inclusion of controls for differences in economic 
preferences, constraints, and beliefs; and 2). Does numeracy have an effect on the trajectory 
of wealth accumulation that people follow over time. The empirical findings revealed that 
numeracy has a unique effect on wealth, over and above the effect of other potential 
confounding factors such as risk preferences, seeking financial advice, beliefs about future 
income, financial knowledge and need for cognition. In addition, a longitudinal model 
showed that numeracy is a key determinant of the wealth accumulation trajectories that people 
follow over time. Over a 5-year period (2007 – 2011), while participants with low numeracy 
tend to decumulate wealth, participants with high numeracy tend to maintain a constant level 
of wealth. These findings provide clear indications that differences in individuals’ numeracy, 
rather than more standard sources of heterogeneity, explain significant variation in wealth. 
These results are important because they show that numeracy is (at least to some degree) an 
independent construct, that is not acting as a proxy for some other cognitive variables, and 
that plays a unique role when it comes to explaining financial behavior.  
In Chapter 3, a new sample was introduced to study whether the effect of numeracy on 
wealth extends to simpler financial environments. In line with Chapter 2, the empirical 
findings in Chapter 3 revealed that higher numeracy was also associated with higher wealth in 
an agrarian population from the Highlands of Peru. In this economy wealth is acquired not 
only through monetary exchanges, but also by barter and reciprocal labor. The finding that 
numeracy is related to wealth in this population is important because it indicates that even in 
this relatively less complex financial environment, where the mathematical demands are 
relatively low, numeracy still plays a clear role in predicting wealth. The findings in this 
chapter contribute to the numeracy literature by extending our understanding of the scope of 
the effects of numeracy. Specifically, they suggest that the effect of numeracy on financial 
behavior goes beyond facilitating mere calculations and extends to how people reason and 
think about numbers and quantities more generally. Chapter 3 further extends the results from 
Chapter 2 documenting that the association between numeracy and wealth was robust after 
accounting for differences in fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and the direct effects 
of education.  
Findings in Chapters 2 and 3 add to the numeracy literature by documenting that 
numeracy has a unique effect on maybe the most important economic outcome, namely an 
individuals’ wealth. I believe establishing the existence of this association is the first step in 
our course to better understand the relationship between numeracy and wealth. Now that we 
have clear evidence that numeracy has a robust association with wealth, we can move to study 
what are the possible mechanisms by which numeracy affects wealth accumulation.  
In the subsequent chapter, Chapter 4, I aimed to understand how numeracy and wealth 
can be related. To this end, this chapter builds forth on the idea that numeracy is 
systematically associated to individuals’ economic preferences (i.e., risk and time 
preferences) that are likely to affect financial behavior. In particular, this chapter explored 
whether numeracy is associated with an individual’s willingness to take risk and found that 
this relationship is more complex than we originally thought. When the payoff was low, there 
were no significant differences in the willingness to take risk between individuals with lower 
and higher numeracy. On the contrary, when the payoff was high, individuals with higher 
numeracy were significantly less willing to take risk than participants with lower numeracy. 
Furthermore, the findings show that while the risky choices of participants with higher 
numeracy varied according to the stakes of the lotteries, the choices of low numerate 
participants appeared to be invariant to changes in payoffs.  
In order to gain further understanding on how and why differences in risk attitudes 
might arise, Chapter 4 explored whether these differences were explained by lower and higher 
numerate people using different decision strategies. Specifically, in this chapter I 
comparatively investigate the use of four decision strategies (i.e., expected value strategy, 
least-likely, maximin, and maximax). A decision strategy describes how the information is 
being used to make a decision. Then, it tells us what type of information is being prioritized, 
what type of information is being neglected, and what criteria are being used to choose 
between the different alternatives (Table 1 in Chapter 3 summarizes the decision criteria for 
these four strategies). Each of the strategies considered in this chapter has a particular way to 
handle probabilities and outcomes inherent to choices under risk. We can then use people’s 
decision strategies to study the cognitive processes behind their choices. For instances, the 
decision strategy can tell us whether the person combined both outcome and probabilities, as 
is the case for people following an expected value strategy, or whether the person considered 
only the worst outcome independent of the probability, as is the case for someone following 
the maximin strategy. The findings in Chapter 4 revealed that as participants’ numeracy 
increased, the likelihood of using an expected value strategy increased when payoffs were 
low, but decreased when payoffs were high. The opposite was observed for the maximin 
strategy. Independently of the payoffs, as numeracy increased the likelihood of choosing the 
least-likely or the maximax strategy decreased. 
The findings in Chapter 4 are of particular importance because they add precision to 
the predictions of the risk attitudes and risk behaviors of the more and less numerate. Based 
on these findings, I would expect that the magnitude of the outcomes would help to predict 
the choices of the higher numerate, but it would be less informative to predict the choices of 
the lower numerate. The findings in Chapter 4 also imply that numeracy has an effect on how 
the information is processed and on the criteria that are being used when making a decision. 
This result is important because it provides first evidence that numeracy also influences the 
specific cognitive processes underlying individual decision making, and not only the handling 
of numbers. Below, in the section called “How is numeracy related to wealth?” I hypothesize 
on how different risk attitudes for low and high payoffs as well as the use of different decision 
strategies can lead to accumulating more wealth.   
After having summarized the empirical findings presented in this thesis, let me now 
return to the central questions of this thesis, namely what is numeracy and how is numeracy 
related to wealth, and discuss the answers my research gives. I also elaborate on future lines 
of research that may further increase our understanding of the psychology of numeracy and its 
relationship with wealth and other financial outcomes.  
 
What is numeracy? 
In the Introduction I described that numeracy encompasses not only the ability to 
calculate but that it extends further to how people reason and think about numbers and 
quantities more generally (Peters, 2012; Nelson, Reyna, Fagerlin, Lipkus, & Peters, 2008; 
Fagerlin, Zikmund-Fisher, Ubel, Jankovic, Derry, & Smith, 2007; Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, 
Ghazal, & García-Retamero, 2012). However, theories on the psychology of numeracy have 
developed much faster than the empirical work that tests those theories (see Nelson et al., 
2008) and only recently have we started to better understand what cognitive processes are 
colored by people’s numeracy. For instance, there is by now substantive evidence that 
numeracy is systematically associated with cognitive biases such as framing effects (Peters et 
al., 2006), conjunction and disjunction fallacies, and the ratio-bias phenomena (Liberali, 
Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012). The findings obtained in Chapter 4 add to our 
understanding of the cognitive processes affected by numeracy. Specifically, these results 
suggest that numeracy influences how information about outcomes and probabilities is being 
used in order to make a decision, that is what information is prioritized, what information is 
neglected and what criteria are being used to select one alternative over the others. 
Therefore, based on the findings in Chapter 4, I adhere to the idea of numeracy as an 
individual’s ability that extends beyond calculation abilities to color the way people perceive 
their world, how they understand the problems around them and the strategies they use to 
solve those problems.  
How is numeracy related to wealth? 
After accumulating compelling evidence that the association between numeracy and 
wealth is robust, statistically significant and economically relevant (Chapters 2 and 3), we can 
hypothesize on how numeracy affects wealth. Based on the findings in Chapter 4, I propose 
that one possible mechanism is that numeracy is associated with the willingness to take risk 
and that willingness to take risk in turn influences individuals’ financial choices. One finding 
from Chapter 4 that is of particular importance in light of this model, is the finding that 
participants with higher numeracy are less willing to take risk when the stakes at play are 
relatively high. This finding shows that the mechanism by which numeracy affects 
willingness to take risk and in turn wealth accumulation, seems to be modulated by the 
magnitude of the potential outcomes. How can a preference for taking less financial risk lead 
to accumulating higher wealth? I propose that by limiting the exposure to risk, individuals 
with higher numeracy reduce the volatility of their income. With a more stable cash flow of 
income, it is easier for individuals to make and stick to a budget and, therefore, easier to save. 
On the contrary, high income volatility, not only makes it more difficult for individuals to 
plan consumption and savings, but it can also cause them to turn to costly solutions to short-
term cash flow shortfalls, with both factors having detrimental consequences on wealth.  
Findings in Chapter 4 also revealed that numeracy was related to the decision 
strategies underlying people’s choices. How can the maximin strategy and the expected value 
strategy affect wealth accumulation? I believe following a maximin strategy protects people 
from experiencing extreme negative outcomes. As I see it, individuals following this strategy 
adopt a prudent attitude towards risk. They foresee the potential negative consequences of 
their choices and take actions to protect themselves from extreme negative financial 
situations. This prudent risk behavior, when the outcomes are high, protects individuals from 
ending up in very disadvantageous financial situation, such as losing their life savings. One 
behavior that is consistent with this strategy would be to buy insurance for home and property 
damage. I would expect people with higher numeracy to have this type of insurance.  
However, being too prudent is not always good because one may miss opportunities 
that are profitable. Especially in situations where the outcomes are not too consequential for 
people’s finances, it may be advantageous to take risk. One behavior that is consistent with 
this strategy is to not buy insurance for small possession such as bikes or cellphones. Based 
on the findings in Chapter 4, I would expect people with higher numeracy to not have these 
type of insurances.  
Can numeracy be improved? 
Given the important role of numeracy on people’s financial wellbeing, it is pertinent to 
ask whether and, if so, how numeracy can be improved. The latest report from the OECD’s 
Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC), which 
measures numeracy skills among adolescents and adults aged 16-65 from 24 countries, 
indicated that countries investing on providing a high-quality primary and middle education 
have made significant progress improving numeracy proficiency. For instance, while older 
Koreans (55-65 year-olds) are among the lowest-performing countries, younger Korean (16-
24 year-olds) are among the top performers. The same was observed with Finns. The progress 
that these countries have made in improving numeracy skills of their population over 
successive generations strongly suggests that numeracy can be improved through policy and 
changes to the educational system (OECD, 2013).   
A related question is whether it is possible to improve people’s numeracy after they 
have completed their formal education (i.e., after finishing high school or a higher education). 
A recent overview of the literature (Brooks, Giles, Harman, Kendall, Rees, & Whittaker, 
2001) and a meta-analysis (Torgerson, Porthouse, & Brooks, 2003) concluded that the overall 
evidence is suggestive of a benefit of adult numeracy interventions. However, the 
heterogeneity of the studies makes it difficult to determine the precise role of any particular 
type of intervention (i.e., counseling, seminar or workshop, exposure to information such as a 
newsletter or a fair; Brooks et al., 2001; Torgerson et al., 2003). Moreover, researchers have 
suggested to look at these findings with caution since they may be undermined by the 
presence of substantial publication bias (Torgerson et al., 2003).  
Finally, we can ask the question of whether an intervention to improve people’s 
numeracy would have long-lasting effects on people’s wealth. To my knowledge there is no 
empirical evidence specifically testing this hypothesis. However, related research has been 
done in the field of financial literacy and financial education. The overall evidence suggests 
that the effect of financial education on financial outcomes is very limited (see Fernandes, 
Lynch, & Netemeyer, 2013). A meta-analysis performed on the impact of financial education 
on financial literacy and financial outcomes showed that interventions to improve financial 
literacy explain only 0.1% of variance in financial behaviors. This meta-analysis also revealed 
that benefits of financial education decline over time and even large interventions with many 
hours of instruction have negligible behavioral effects after 20 months (Fernandes et al., 
2013). Experts in the field have suggested that one of the reasons to explain why these 
programs may fail is that there is not enough focus on the numeracy skills needed to improve 
people’s financial capability (Carpena, Cole, Shapiro, & Bilal, 2011; Lusardi, 2012). There is, 
however, no empirical research to support their statement.  
As yet, we have little concrete evidence to provide an answer to the question of how to 
improve numeracy. We have a pressing need for more and better research to inform the 
design of numeracy interventions that can support individuals to improve financial decision 
making.  
Future directions 
Based on the knowledge we have gained over the years, including the findings 
presented in this thesis, we have a solid based to believe that numeracy is closely linked to 
financial outcomes. However, the causal mechanisms at work are still under investigation. 
Future research, which I hope to have the opportunity to be part of, should focus on better 
understanding these mechanisms. One possible avenue for future research is to explore the 
effect of different mathematical competencies, that are part of the numeracy construct, on the 
financial decision making process. Mathematical competencies such as objective numeracy, 
subjective numeracy and symbolic-number mapping abilities (i.e., internal representation of 
numeric magnitude and the mapping of symbolic numbers onto those representations) have 
shown to have separable influences in evaluations and choice (Peters & Bjalkebring, 2015). 
Therefore, unraveling how they interact with financial information processing, preference 
formation and financial choices would give us novel insights on how numeracy impacts 
financial decision making. Moreover, this research would help us to design better 
interventions to improve the decision making of the low numerate by targeting more specific 
mathematical competencies.  
Another interesting question entails the great heterogeneity of numeracy across 
countries. Comparative research has documented important differences in numeracy 
proficiency across countries (OECD, 2013). Future research could study how numeracy is 
taught in high and low numeracy achiever countries. An integrated approach investigating 
how numeracy is taught and practiced at school, at home, and in daily life would provide a 
better understanding of how citizens in the high-achiever countries appear to achieve those 
high numeracy scores. I am interested in studying what happens inside the classrooms, and 
specifically, to identify whether factors such as the level of cognitive demands, the number of 
hours of class per year, the quality of teachers’ feedback, the type of mathematical books that 
children follow, the number of mathematical problems discussed in class, or the curriculum 
coverage could help us to explain these differences between countries.  
This thesis also provides some methodological implications for the study of wealth. 
The findings presented here suggest that measures of numeracy, intelligence and education 
may not be interchangeable for the purpose of explaining differences in wealth. Each of these 
factors has a unique and independent effect on wealth and wealth accumulation over time, and 
may do so through various mechanisms. Therefore, based on the empirical evidence reported 
in this thesis, I recommend including measures of numeracy, along with measures of 
intelligence and education, as an important control measure in wealth research. 
Concluding remark 
Numbers are an inextricable part of people’s life. Numbers are necessary not only for 
simple, daily tasks such as calculating an appropriate tip for a waiter, but also for more 
complex decisions such as buying a house or starting a new business. One context in which 
numbers are particularly pervasive, and have striking importance, is financial decision 
making. Financial information such as prices, fees, interest rates, amortizations, saving rates, 
risks, or profits are all communicated using numerical information. These numbers convey 
important information about the different alternatives and they are necessary to make well-
founded judgments about the different options. I believe numeracy plays a critical role in how 
people cope with this information. Moreover, I believe the way people cope with numerical 
information has a profound effects on people’s saving, spending and borrowing decisions, 
which are conducive to the accumulation or decumulation of wealth. Therefore, I plead for 
valuing numeracy as an important factor affecting people’s financial outcomes, and I hope the 
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Interesting mathematical problems!! 
1. There is a three digit number. The second digit is four times as big as the third digit, while 
the first digit is three less than the second digit. What is the number? 
 
2. Which 3 numbers have the same answer whether they’re added or multiplied together?  
 
3. There is a basket containing 5 apples, how do you divide the apples among 5 children so 
that each child has 1 apple while 1 apple remains in the basket?  
 
4. Complete this grid with the digits 1 to 6 to make the sum correct. Perform each 
mathematical operation in the order shown, from left to right, e.g. 1 + 2 x 3 is treated as (1 + 
2) x 3 = 9. Note: there is no ÷ 1, and at no point is a decimal or fraction used. 
 
 
5. A ship anchored in a port has a ladder which hangs over the side. The length of the ladder 
is 200cm, the distance between each rung in 20cm and the bottom rung touches the water. The 
tide rises at a rate of 10cm an hour. When will the water reach the fifth rung?  
 
__________ 
Answers: (1) 141. (2) 1, 2 and 3. (3) 4 children get 1 apple each while the fifth child gets the basket with the 
remaining apple still in it. (4) 2 + 4 − 1 × 6 ÷ 3 × 5 = 50. (5) The tide raises both the water and the boat so the 
water will never reach the fifth rung. Retrieved from http://www.brainbashers.com and 
http://www.kidsmathgamesonline.com.  
